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Have We Come Full Circle? Judicial
Sentencing Discretion Restored in Booker and
Fanfan
Sandra D. Jordan
Abstract
The much anticipated Supreme Court decision in United States v. Booker and
Fanfan has both invalidated the mandatory nature of the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines as well as restored judicial discretion for federal judges. With the Booker de-
cision there is a renewed opportunity to correct some of the imbalance that came
about as a result of the mandatory guidelines and the sentencing policies of the
past twenty years. Booker has implications for all future sentencing as the power
between the judiciary and the jury has been realigned and the power of the govern-
ment has been reduced. Sentencing cannot accomplish legitimate goals when it is
absolutely uniform nationwide regardless of any justifiable distinctions between
defendants or crimes. Based on this principle, the goals of the United States Sen-
tencing Commission were to eliminate unwarranted departures and to advance the
goals of uniformity and proportionality. Warranted departures are those factors
that should be taken into account when sentencing. In drafting the Guidelines,
the Commission sought to establish a system that maintained fairness and avoided
rote application in sentencing practices.
Instead, the Guidelines that became effective in 1987 produced a mandatory, rote
sentencing process that omitted any judicial discretion and promoted a much-
criticized shift in power from the judiciary to the prosecution. Judges resented the
fact that their sentencing discretion had evaporated as sentences became harsher
and the prison population in this country has swelled to unprecedented numbers.
Booker will promote sentencing that is likely to be closer to the original goals
of the Sentencing Reform Act which contemplated that sentences would reflect
fairness and certainty, two of the hallmarks of due process. With the Booker de-
cision, the Court has opened the way to promote alternative sentencing methods
and to allow the judiciary to consider all relevant matters when sentencing. Lower
courts will use the “reasonableness” standard to achieve the goals and policies of
sentencing: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation. In doing so,
courts will now be able to consider all relevant factors concerning a defendant and
the offense, restored discretion in sentencing.
1HAVE WE COME FULL CIRCLE? JUDICIAL SENTENCING DISCRETION 
RESTORED IN BOOKER AND FANFAN
Professor Sandra D. Jordan
University of Pittsburgh School of Law
Introduction
Judicial sentencing discretion is alive and well. After almost twenty years of 
regimented sentencing in federal courts, judicial discretion has been restored and 
prosecutorial power has been curtailed.  With a much anticipated decision, the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Booker1 and United States v. Fanfan2 found that the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) were unconstitutional.  In its rare dual 
majority opinions, the Court remedied the constitutional violation by excising two 
provisions of the Guidelines and retaining the remainder of the sentencing scheme as 
advisory.  The Booker3 decision restores judicial discretion, a key component of 
sentencing that has been absent for the last twenty years.
This article will provide in Part I an overview of the sentencing policies, focusing 
on the goals of the Sentencing Reform Act of 19844 (“SRA”) and the operation of the 
indeterminate sentencing scheme that preceded the Guidelines.  The passage of the SRA 
occurred in response to a mounting dissatisfaction with a sentencing system that featured 
widespread disparity and discrimination.5 Because of the discretionary nature of the 
indeterminate sentencing scheme and the resulting disparities in sentences, legal 
observers and the public grew critical of a sentencing system which used imprecise 
parameters and lacked intelligent justification.6 The most notable problems prior to 
1
 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
2 Id.
3
 In this article I refer to both decisions as Booker except where I am making specific reference to the facts 
of Fanfan.
4
 28 U.S.C. §§ 992-998 (2000); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586 (2000).
5
 See Federal Sentencing Guidelines, Edward M. Kennedy, Forward, 29 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 771, ix (1992) 
(“Passage of the Act marked the end of a sentencing system that had long been a national disgrace.”).
6
 Sentencing anomalies were the horror stories that spurred the federal sentencing authority revamping.  A 
defendant could be convicted of the same crime in different districts across the country and have a wide 
disparity of sentence imposed depending on the judge responsible.  Moreover, prosecutorial priorities 
played a big role in the sentencing disparities.  For example, in the Southern District of Florida, a federal 
district handling major drug cases, the office routinely declined cases involving large quantities of drugs, 
cases that would be deemed major investigations in many other federal judicial districts.  These disparities 
were by no means limited to drug cases.  In white collar criminal cases a criminal defendant in one district 
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2enactment of the SRA were the vastly disparate sentences received by similarly situated 
defendants appearing before different judges.7
The SRA created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent 
commission of the judicial branch.  The purpose of the Commission, as mandated by 
Congress in the SRA, was to provide “certainty” and “fairness”  in sentencing, which are 
two of the hallmarks of due process.8
Prior to the guidelines, judges were not required to state their reasons for 
imposing sentence and, often, the sentence reflected the judicial philosophy and even the 
prejudices of the individual judge.9 Spearheaded by Senator Edward M. Kennedy, the
Guidelines were created by Congress in 1987 in a spirit of bipartisan cooperation and 
political compromise. After the passage of the SRA and the implementation of the 
Guidelines, Congress established mandatory minimums;10 the prison population swelled 
to unprecedented numbers;11 and the rigidity of the sentencing practices divided 
interested observers.12 After 1987, federal judges saw their traditional discretionary 
sentencing prerogatives disappear.  The Booker decision is likely to reinvigorate judicial 
discretion.  This first section of the article will briefly review the cycle of sentencing in 
could be sentenced to probation, while in another district similar conduct would warrant a sentence of 5 
years or more.
7
 Kennedy, supra note 5, at ix.  See also William W. Wilkins, Jr., Response to Judge Heany, 29 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 795, 797 (1992) (“The actual sentence imposed  was too often a result of the luck of the draw or 
the assignment of a judge to a particular case.”).
8
 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).
9
 See Theresa Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Congressional 
Goals?: An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY L.J. 393, 396 (1991).
10
 There are over 60 federal mandatory minimum statutes containing over 100 different mandatory 
sentencing provisions.  William W. Schwarzer, Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory Minimums:  The 
Need for Separate Evaluation, 4 FED. SENTENCING REP. 352, 353 (1992); UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:  MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 4 (1991).
11
 The prison population in the United States has reached unprecedented numbers.  For the reported year 
2003, the federal and state prisons held 1,387,000 prisoners.  When added to the 691,301 persons held in 
local jail facilities, the total number of incarcerated adults has exceeded 2 million people.  One in 140 
people in this country are incarcerated.  www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p03.htm.
12
 Critics of the Sentencing Guidelines include individuals from many constituencies, ranging from 
Supreme Court justices, national bar associations to lay members of the public. See, e.g., Clyde E. Bailey, 
Sr., The Critical Need for Reform of the Sentencing Laws and Policies of the Federal And State 
Governments of the United States, National Bar Association, May 3, 2004.  http://www.nationalbar.org/pdf/
Kennedy060104.pdf.  The NBA took the strong position that the current policies in the criminal justice 
system over-emphasize incarceration and focus on incarcerating people for their addictions.  “. . . [T]he 
federal sentencing guidelines should permit the exercise of judicial discretion to depart downward for those 
women and other young drug users who may engage in minor drug trafficking merely to get their own drug 
supply or to avoid duress, coercion or assaultive conduct against them as victims.”  Id. at 3.
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3the federal courts since the 1980s and demonstrate why the Court’s latest decisions have 
returned sentencing jurisprudence back to when the SRA first began the dialogue on 
sentencing in 1984.  In fact, the Booker decision has resurrected the true original 
purposes of the Guidelines as articulated in the SRA.13 Moreover, prosecutors no longer 
have presumptive power to pre-determine a sentence or to control favorable information 
at sentencing.
Part II of the article details the latest decision by the Supreme Court in the Booker
case.  In companion five-to-four majorities comprised of different justices,14 the Court 
held that the Guidelines actually obligated courts to find facts that increased a 
defendant’s sentence a practice which violated the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.  
The Court reaffirmed the Sixth Amendment rights of criminal defendants to be sentenced 
based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt by excising two sections of the Sentencing 
Guidelines and upholding the remaining body of the Guidelines as advisory only. In both 
opinions, the Court effectively dismantled much of the power of the Sentencing 
Commission, eliminated the mandatory nature of the Guidelines15 and brought federal 
sentencing discretion back to the status that lead to the sentencing debates in the mid-
1980s.
Next, in Part III this article will discuss the dilemma for lower courts in defining 
“reasonableness” according to Booker’s directives.  By setting forth a reasonable standard 
in sentencing policy, the Court returned to the lower courts much of the discretion that 
prior sentencing rules had removed.  There are two extreme interpretations given to this 
directive.  Courts can ignore the sentencing history of the past twenty years and sentence 
as if the Guidelines never existed.  Courts could also accord the Guidelines the greatest 
weight and most deference, similar to the mandatory Guidelines system.  However, 
13
 “Finally, the Act without its ‘mandatory’ provision and related language remains consistent with 
Congress’ initial and basic sentencing intent, to ‘provide certainty and fairness . . . [while] maintaining 
sufficient flexibility to permit individualized sentences. . .’  28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B).”  Booker, 125 S. Ct. 
at 767.  Congress had as its goal avoiding “unwarranted sentencing disparities [but] permit[ting] . . . 
warranted [disparities].”  Id.
14
 Justice Ginsburg signed both opinions.  The substantive opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined 
by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg.  The remedial opinion was written by Justice Breyer, 
joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg.  The coalitions were further divided by the six
other concurrences and dissenting opinions filed by eight out of the nine justices.
15
 Although the Court eliminated the mandatory nature of the Guidelines, it did not re-establish the parole 
system.  Paroling authority served as a safety net for overly harsh sentences and provided an opportunity 
for prisoners to demonstrate reforms and rehabilitation looking toward ultimate release from prison.
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4neither approach is consistent with Booker.  Sentencing courts will be challenged to find 
a common ground to effect the purposes of sentencing by drawing on the original intent 
of the SRA and developing the “ common law” of sentencing.16
Part IV focuses on the sentencing concepts that were critical under a mandatory 
sentencing system and that are now either no longer relevant or of greatly diminished 
significance.  Concepts such as departures and substantial assistance will not have the 
same importance after Booker and this section will suggest why these Guidelines-
concepts no longer apply.
Finally, in Part V this article takes the position that Booker  compels the lower 
courts to give full consideration to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), which contains sentencing 
factors that were virtually ignored under a mandatory guidelines structure. This 
consideration will afford the opportunity for a defendant to seek a departure or a non-
Guidelines sentence.  By doing so, a sentencing court can defer to the Guidelines
structure and at the same time fashion a sentence that is individualized to each defendant.  
In so doing, the court will comply with the intent of Congress when it sought to “provide 
certainty and fairness in meeting the purposes of sentencing, [while] avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities . . . [and] maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted.”17  Moreover, by exercising full discretion and 
giving full weight to section 3553(a) factors, the courts will curtail the prosecutorial 
power that has wrecked havoc with the implementation of the Guidelines. This outcome 
restores the constitutional balance of power between the three branches of government.
I. Brief Overview of Sentencing Policies
A. Indeterminate Sentencing
The pre-1980s indeterminate sentencing scheme seems to be a historical relic 
when viewed from the perspective of the Guidelines sentencing era.  One of the many 
positive aspects of the traditional indeterminate sentencing scheme was the individualized 
16
 A “‘common law of sentencing’ was a fundamental component of the guidelines model that hoped to 
take advantage of ‘the interlocking substantive lawmaking competencies of the commission and the 
judiciary.’”  Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that 
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 34 (2000) (quoting Kevin R. 
Reitz, Sentencing Guideline Systems and Sentence Appeals: A Comparison of Federal and State 
Experiences, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1441, 1455 (1997)).
17
 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).
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5structure.  Sentences were crafted based not only on the offense but also on the specific 
characteristics of the defendant’s history.
Viewing the case from the bench, a judge had almost boundless authority to 
evaluate the prosecution, the defense, and the victim when imposing a sentence 
appropriate to the case.  Sentencing discretion was virtually unrestrained, as long as the 
sentence was within the legal range of the allowable term of months or years set forth by 
Congress in passing the statutory scheme or statutory maximum.18 Prior to the 
Guidelines, there was virtually no appellate review of district court sentences: appellate 
courts accepted the sentence unless it was clearly erroneous.19
Sentencing discretion also existed while the sentence was being served.  Then, the
paroling authority was available to continually monitor a prisoner’s progress and to allow 
for early release in cases where warranted. Prisoners could earn early release through 
good behavior or good time credits, demonstrating at least a partial system-wide 
rehabilitative process.  Finally, the executive pardon, although rarely used, addressed 
miscarriages of justice and also injected compassion and redemption into the criminal 
justice system.20 Thus, discretion and parole were two of the distinct qualities that 
characterized an indeterminate sentencing system because they could temper punishment 
at either the sentencing decision or during the sentence, or both.21
However, much of the criticism of this unrestrained era was prompted by 
inconsistent results. Public sentiment had shifted as observers critically examined this 
wide, unreviewable discretion enjoyed by the bench.22
B. Goals of the Sentencing Reform Act
Sentencing policy in the federal courts underwent a tremendous upheaval, 
beginning with the passage of the SRA in 1984, leading to the establishment of the 
18
 Any term of imprisonment, up to the statutory maximum, was permissible.  Sentence mitigation fell to 
the parole authorities to temper the punishment in situations where the prisoner’s rehabilitative efforts 
warranted early release.
19 In United States v. Koon, the Court held that the appropriate standard of review for lower court 
sentencing was abuse of discretion.  518 U.S. 81 (1996).  Koon was widely viewed as giving judges the 
widest amount of discretion over sentencing.
20 See generally Margaret Colgate Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons:  Reflections on the 
President’s Duty to Be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000) (discussing the use of the presidential 
pardon power). 
21
 Both discretion and parole were removed in the modern sentencing reform.
22 See Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentences Discretion: The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 884 (1990).
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6Sentencing Commission in 1987 and the passage of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines, effective that same year.  This sentencing reform was motivated by 
documented unfairness inherent in an indeterminate sentencing scheme.  When similarly 
situated offenders received punishments that wildly diverged, the interests of justice and 
fairness were implicated. The Congressional goal of sentencing reform was to “move the 
sentencing system in the direction of increased uniformity.  That uniformity does not 
consist simply of similar sentences for those convicted of violations of the same 
statute. . . .  It consists . . . of similar relationships between sentences and real conduct, 
relationships that Congress’ sentencing statutes helped to advance. . . .”23
The Commission was established to develop policies that “[a]void[] unwarranted 
sentencing disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar criminal conduct while maintaining sufficient flexibility to permit 
individualized sentences when warranted by mitigating or aggravating factors not taken 
into account in the establishment of general sentencing practices.”24  The task that the 
Commission faced was exceedingly complex and it recognized “the difficulty of 
foreseeing and capturing a single set of guidelines that encompasse[d] the vast range of 
human conduct potentially relevant to a sentencing decision.”25 Precisely because of the 
wide range of human nature and the ever expanding federal crimes code, the Commission 
refused to “limit the kind of factors (whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the 
Guidelines) that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case.”26
The drafters of the Guidelines sought to establish a “common law of sentencing”
with judicial input and reasoned evolution.27  The Commission’s original intent was to 
develop sentencing policies that would allow “trial and appellate judges, through their 
articulation and review of reasons supporting decisions to depart from the guidelines in 
individual cases, [and] have their say in the evolution of principled and purposeful 
sentencing law and policy.”28  Rather than minimize the courts’ involvement in 
23 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 761.
24
 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
25
 U.S.S.G. ch. I, pt. A, intro. cmt. 4(b).
26 Id.
27
 Berman, supra note 16, at 34.
28 Id. at 35.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art14
7sentencing, the Commission envisioned courts with a much greater role in framing 
sentencing policy over the years through appellate review.  As one observer commented,
[t]he courts would have responsibility, however, for developing a 
jurisprudential approach to those occasions in which it is appropriate to set 
guideline presumptions aside. The commission, for its part, would benefit 
from the ongoing elaboration of such a common law of sentencing. Over 
time, the substantive principles developed by judges could coexist with, or 
even be incorporated into, the guidelines themselves. Such a partnership 
model of shared institutional powers was thus a core component of the 
reformist ideal.29
Unfortunately, these sentencing objectives and goals failed to materialize under the 
mandatory system that developed after the passage of the SRA.
C. Sentencing under Mandatory Guidelines
The SRA had the noble goal of eliminating sentencing disparity across the federal 
judicial districts and among the judges within a district.  What actually came about was a 
harsh, rigid set of sentencing rules that omitted judicial input and favored executive 
control. For the last two decades, criminal sentencing in federal court has been controlled 
by Guidelines.  Soon after their passage, the Supreme Court held that the Guidelines were 
binding for all sentences in federal court.30
After 1987, judges lost their broad and unstructured discretion in crafting 
appropriate punishments for federal offenders. Congress voided the indeterminate scheme 
in favor of a determinate sentencing structure.  With the advent of the mandatory 
Guidelines, judicial sentencing discretion in the federal court system virtually evaporated.
Federal judges’ dislike of the Guidelines was widely acknowledged and is evident by the 
fact that federal judges retired more quickly under a Guidelines system.31 The Guidelines
reduced all federal sentences to a mathematical grid,32 and, almost without exception, the 
29
 Reitz, supra note 16.
30
 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 391 (1989) (“the Guidelines bind judges and courts in the 
exercise of their uncontested responsibility to pass sentence in criminal cases.");  Stinson v. United States, 
508 U.S. 36, 42 (1993) (“Commentary which functions to ‘interpret [a] guideline or explain how it is to be 
applied…controls….).
31
 Boylan, Do the Sentencing Guidelines Influence the Retirement Decisions of Federal Judges? 33 J. Legal 
Stud. 231 (2004). The author concluded that “sentencing guidelines lead judges to take senior status earlier.  
Specifically, under the sentencing guidelines, district court judges take senior status .4 years after becoming 
eligible to do so.  Without the sentencing guidelines, district court judges would select senior status 3 years 
after becoming eligible.” Id. at 231.  
32 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table.
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8United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”) predetermined the outcome by the way in 
which it charged a defendant.33  The determinate Guidelines scheme required judges to 
perform a mechanical task after conviction by sentencing a defendant from among a 
mind-boggling 258 possible categories.34 However despite the initial reaction, the bench 
became accustomed to the harsh sentencing structure and the new sentencing concepts 
such as “relevant conduct,” “ranges,” and “departures.” The Guidelines terminology and 
parameters framed sentencing language and methods of evaluation.  During the last 
twenty years Congress has increased control over sentencing by imposing harsher 
statutory sentencing schemes and establishing mandatory minimums.
In the midst of these sentencing overhauls, in 1986 Congress passed the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act establishing mandatory minimums of five to twenty years in prison for a 
variety of drug-related offenses.35 With the addition of mandatory minimums setting a 
base line level below which no sentence could fall, sentencing advocacy plummeted.36
The combination of mandatory minimums and sentencing guidelines severely 
restricted the ability of judges to craft discretionary sentences.  As an American Bar 
Association Task Force recently observed:
The effect on sentencing decisions was enormous.  Beginning in the late 
1970s, the United States began to respond to concerns about rising crime 
by implementing an array of policy changes which, in the aggregate, 
produced a steady, dramatic, and unprecedented increase in the population 
of the nation’s prisons and jails.  Between 1974 and 2002, the number of 
inmates in federal and state prisons rose from 216,000 to 1,355,748, a 
more than five-fold increase.  Between 1974 and 2001, the rate of 
imprisonment rose from 149 inmates to 628 inmates per 100,000 
population, a more than four-fold increase. Jail populations have also 
increased markedly. Between 1985 and 2002, the number of persons held 
in local jails more than doubled, from 256,615 to 665,475.  By mid-year 
33
 For example, the prosecutor had wide discretion to set the amount of loss, the quantity of drugs, or the 
scope and participants in a conspiracy.  In addition, the prosecutor could exercise discretion to establish the 
length of time a conspiracy existed and identify the leaders and organizers.  Each of these factors had 
significant implications for the ultimate sentence a offender would receive.
34
 The federal sentencing Guidelines have a base offense level from 1-43 and a criminal history range of 
1-6., thus producing 258 distinct grids.
35
 See Eric E. Sterling, The Sentencing Boomerang: Drug Prohibition, Politics and Reform, 40 VILL. L. 
REV. 383, 408 (1995).  The statutory minimums bill was expedited in light of the drug hysteria centered 
around crack cocaine. Id. at 408-11.
36
 Sentencing advocacy plummeted because the defendant facing sentencing is motivated to assist the 
government, often to the detriment of personal advocacy.  A defendant may engage in conduct that is 
detrimental to the defense position in order to gain a benefit in sentencing.  
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92002, the combined number of inmates in federal and state prisons and 
jails exceeded two million.37
Judges have been vocal in their criticism of the Guidelines calling them “unjust”
and “harsh” because of the way they operate in a mandatory sentencing system: the 
harshness of the Guidelines results in unnecessary punishment in many cases.38  Further, 
Justice Kennedy was critical of the Guidelines because they strip the discretionary 
authority of judges.  He recently stated that courts should not have to “blindly follow 
unjust guidelines.”39
Judges resented the fact that the Guidelines removed most of the judicial 
discretion and many concerned observers held the view that the Guidelines system failed 
to achieve the original goals that were set.  “Efforts to eliminate disparity in sentencing 
have resulted in an incursion on the independence of the federal judiciary, a transfer of 
power from the judiciary to prosecutors and a proliferation of unjustifiably harsh 
individual sentences.”40  The most obvious result of the Guidelines has been harsher 
sentences, many with an adverse racial impact.41  Long prison sentences have become the 
norm in the federal system with little diversion to alternative punishment options.  Judges 
simply did not have the flexibility to adjust sentences to alternative punishments, but 
instead were directed through the guidelines structure to send offenders to prison.
As judicial influence decreased, prosecutorial power grew, producing an 
unanticipated power shift.42 In addition, the United States Supreme Court refined its 
37
 Report, ABA Justice Kennedy Commission Task Force, 16 (citations omitted) (2004), available at
www.abanet.org/leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/121A.doc.
38 See, e.g., Rhonda McMillion, Second Effort: ABA Supports Push to Restore Judicial Discretion in 
Sentencing, 90 A.B.A. 62 (Jan. 2004).
39 Hearing on Fiscal Year 2005 Appropriations for the Supreme Court Before the House Appropriations 
Comm., 109th Cong. (2004) (Statement of Justice Kennedy), see Gina Holland, Justice Applauds Bucking 
Sentencing Law, at http://news.findlaw.com (Mar. 17, 2004) (quoting Justice Kennedy’s view of the 
guidelines).
40
 American College of Trial Lawyers, United States Sentencing Guidelines 2004:  An Experiment That 
Has Failed 1 (Irvine, CA: American College of Trial Lawyers, Sept. 2004).
41See infra, notes 151-163 and accompanying text.
42 Prosecutors were in the exclusive position to identify the target or subject of the inquiry, define the 
relevant conduct, supervise the investigation, draft the charges, prosecute the case, and offer the potential 
for special sentencing considerations such as bargaining or substantial assistance.  While most of these 
functions were the traditional prerogative of the executive, the judiciary always had the power to check 
executive abuses by imposing tempered punishments.  Moreover, the paroling authority maintained the 
prerogative to release prisoners at some point when they have demonstrated a degree of rehabilitation.  
Because the majority of criminal offenses in a mandatory Guidelines system are resolved through pleas, the 
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interpretation of the limits of judicial discretion in a series of cases, beginning, most 
notably, with the decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey.43 Apprendi restricted the basis 
upon which a court could sentence a defendant to only those facts found by a jury.
Apprendi found a Sixth Amendment violation where the sentence was based on judicially 
found facts rather than facts supported by a jury verdict.  The holding in Apprendi was 
limited to sentencing within a statutory maximum and courts could no longer find 
additional facts on which to base a sentence.
As the Supreme Court was defining the precise intersection between the Sixth 
Amendment and sentencing policy, the Blakely v. Washington case arose. 44 Blakely was 
a bombshell in sentencing jurisprudence. Robert Blakely had entered a guilty plea to 
second degree kidnapping in an agreement with the government.  In exchange, he was 
subject to a ten year statutory maximum, with a sentencing guidelines range of 49-53 
months, also by statutory enactment.  When the court heard the horrific details of the 
kidnapping, the judge rejected the plea agreement and sentenced Blakely to ninety 
months.
The Blakely Court extended the holding of Apprendi to apply to any fact that 
increased a sentence beyond that found by a jury or admitted by a defendant.45 Blakely
thus impacted all sentences within a mandatory Guidelines system, although the Court 
held that the decision did not apply to the federal Guidelines. In clarifying Apprendi, 
Blakely ruled that a court cannot sentence a defendant by reference to enhancing facts 
that were not presented to a jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt: to do so would be 
government controls the outcome by coupling the charges with the anticipated sentence to achieve a desired 
result.
43
 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  See discussion, infra Part II.
44 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).  Blakely was charged with two counts of first degree kidnapping but he entered 
into a plea arrangement with the government to plead guilty to second degree kidnapping. Id. at 2534.
Under Washington law, the more serious kidnapping offense was categorized as a Class B offense and 
carried a 10 year maximum penalty.  Id. at 2535.  The state of Washington established a sentencing range 
for second degree kidnapping offense of 49-53 months by statutory enactment.  Id.  The prosecutor agreed 
to recommend a sentence within this standard range and the defendant entered a plea of guilty.  Id. at 2534.
The sentencing court held a post-conviction sentencing hearing and listened to the wife’s 
description of the ordeal.  Id. at 2535.  The Court then rejected the plea recommendation and found, by a 
preponderance of evidence, that the defendant acted with “deliberate cruelty” and imposed an exceptional 
sentence of 90 months, significantly longer than the maximum permitted under the standard range to which 
the defendant agreed pursuant to the plea agreement.  Id.
45 Id. at 2538.
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to violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.46 Ultimately, Blakely spawned 
Booker.
II. Booker and Fanfan Cases
A. Dual Opinions
In the companion cases of Booker and Fanfan, the Supreme Court issued an 
unusual dual decision.47  Both opinions were decided by a five-to-four vote, and only 
Justice Ginsburg joined both majorities.48  In Booker, the Court found the federal 
sentencing Guidelines unconstitutional because they permitted a sentencing judge to 
impose a sentence based on facts found by a judge, not a jury.49 This aspect of the 
holding is a natural extension of the Blakely holding applied to the federal Guidelines.  
Under the Court’s interpretation of the Guidelines, the sentence could not exceed that 
authorized by the jury finding in violation of the Sixth Amendment.50  The decisions
were unique in that there were dual majorities: Justice Stevens issued an opinion in 
which he reviewed the merits of the constitutional challenge to the sentencing Guidelines
and found that the Guidelines were unconstitutional; Justice Breyer announced the 
remedy to be imposed in light of the constitutional violation announced in the companion 
opinion.51 Booker benefited from the Court’s substantive opinion;52 Fanfan benefited 
from the Court’s remedial opinion.53  In both cases the defendants were entitled to re-
sentencing based on an advisory Guidelines system.54
1. Freddie Booker
Freddie Booker was convicted of dealing drugs and of possession with the intent 
to distribute at least 50 grams of crack cocaine.55 As a result, he faced a mandatory 
minimum sentence of ten years in federal prison.56
46 Id.
47
 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
48
 The substantive opinion was written by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas and 
Ginsburg.  The remedial opinion was written by Justice Breyer, joined by Rehnquist, O’Connor, Kennedy 
and Ginsburg.  The coalitions were further divided by the six other concurrences and dissenting opinions 
filed by eight out of the nine justices.
49 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
50 Id. at 756.
51 Id. at 746.
52 Id. at 769.
53 Id.
54 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
55 Id. at 746.
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Because of Booker’s criminal history and offense level, his sentence fell within a 
range of 210-262 months, double the mandatory minimum.57 At Booker ’s sentencing 
hearing the judge found additional facts by a preponderance of the evidence, as he was 
entitled to do under the Guidelines structure.58 The judge found factual support for an 
additional 566 grams of crack cocaine, increasing Booker’s Guidelines range to 360 
months to life.59  The sentencing judge followed the Guidelines, evaluated the “relevant 
conduct,” and imposed a sentence of 30 years.60  These additional facts were not found 
by the jury.  The judge concluded that the mandatory nature of the Guidelines required 
that the sentence be increased to accommodate this additional information.61  Booker
raised this additional fact finding as violative of the Court’s decision in Blakely since 
none of the facts were found beyond a reasonable doubt.62  As a result, Booker’s sentence 
blurred the fact-finding role of the judge and the jury in violation of the Sixth 
Amendment.
2. Duncan Fanfan
Duncan Fanfan had a different sentencing problem.  He was also a drug dealer 
convicted of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of cocaine.63  The guilty verdict 
supported the quantity of 500 grams.64 Under the Guidelines, his sentence range was
63-78 months.65  At sentencing, the judge found additional facts66 as relevant conduct 
which could triple Fanfan’s sentence to 188-225 months.67 Fanfan’s judge anticipated 
the impact of Blakely on the Guidelines and declined to sentence under the enhanced 
Guidelines range.  The judge read the Blakely decision to preclude him from enhancing 
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
60 Id. The relevant conduct was determined by examining the underlying criminal conduct and factoring 
this conduct into the sentence range.
61 Id.
62 United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004).
63 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.
64 Id.
65 United States v. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, 2 (D. Me. 2004).
66
 The sentencing judge also found that Fanfan was an organizer and leader of the criminal activity and 
responsible for an additional 2.5 kilos of cocaine and 261.6 grams of crack.  Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.
67 Id.
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Fanfan’s sentence above the range based solely on the jury verdict.68  Thus, Fanfan was 
sentenced to 78 months.69
Even though Fanfan’s judge relied only on facts found by the jury, the sentence 
was struck down in Booker since the sentencing judge applied the Guidelines in a 
mandatory fashion using section 3553(b)(1).70 Fanfan’s sentence did not violate the 
Sixth Amendment, since the facts supporting his sentence were found by a jury.71  His 
sentence violated the Booker holding because it was based on the section that made the 
Guidelines mandatory, a section that Booker excised from the operation of the 
Guidelines.72
B. Substantive Opinion
Justice Stevens’ substantive result in Booker flowed expectedly from the string of 
Supreme Court sentencing cases that had focused on the Sixth Amendment.73 Connecting 
the range of sentencing options to facts found by a judge effectively altered the balance 
of power between the judge and the jury, implicating the Sixth Amendment right to jury 
trial.  In each of those decisions, the Court expanded the reach of the Sixth Amendment’s 
jury trial clause.   In Jones v. United States,74 the Court examined the federal carjacking 
statute and determined that the statute actually delineated three distinct offenses based on 
the extent of harm to the victim.75  The Court concluded that victim harm was really an 
element of the crime because its determination raised the punishment ceiling.76  As a 
result, the extent of harm must be charged and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.77
Apprendi v. New Jersey,78 focused on the maximum sentence established by 
statute.  Apprendi held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be 
68 Id.
69 Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, 5.
70 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73
 In total, the Supreme Court issued 6 opinions: 2 majorities written by Justice Stevens and Breyer, and 4 
dissenting opinions written by Justices Thomas, Scalia, Breyer, and Stevens.
74
 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
75 Id. at 230.
76 Id. at 251 n.11.
77 Id. at 251-52.
78
 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”79  In a death penalty case, 
Ring v. Arizona,80 the Court stated that capital defendants are also entitled to a jury 
determination of “any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment.”81 Blakely v. Washington, the immediate precursor to Booker, 
extended the Apprendi holding to those enhancements that are set by the Guidelines’
range, not only the statutory maximum.82
Justice Stevens’ substantive opinion in Booker adjudicated the merits of the Sixth 
Amendment constitutional challenge.  This majority opinion concluded that the 
mandatory nature of the federal sentencing Guidelines compels their failure.83  The 
mandatory Guidelines allow no vehicle for a defendant to have the foundational 
punishment facts determined by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.  Consequently, Justice 
Stevens found that the Guidelines were in violation of the Sixth Amendment.84
Many observers recognized the inevitable outcome: the Court would have to find 
the Guidelines violative of the Sixth Amendment in the wake of Blakely.85 One judge 
expressed the view that “Blakely dooms the guidelines insofar as they require that 
sentences be based on facts found by a judge.”86 Blakely cast serious doubt on the 
viability of the Guidelines as courts interpreting Blakely have so found.87 In fact, many 
lower courts did not wait for the Booker opinion to invalidate the Guidelines.88
79 Id. at 490.  Although Apprendi caused trepidations among practitioners and academics alike when it was 
decided, in its aftermath the federal Guidelines appeared to be insulated from attack since Apprendi dealt 
with sentencing above a statutory maximum.  In the four years between Apprendi and Blakely, the actual 
impact of Apprendi was rather modest.  Many of the errors caused by the interpretation of Apprendi were 
excused under the more generous plain error standard.
80
 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
81 Id. at 589.
82 124 S. Ct. 2531.
83
 125 S. Ct. at 764.
84 Id. at 746.
85
 “If the Washington scheme does not comport with the constitution, it is hard to imagine a Guidelines
scheme that would.”  Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2550 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
86 United States v. Booker, No. 03-4225, slip op. at 4 (7th Cir. July 9, 2004).
87 See, e.g., United States v. Shamblin, 323 F. Supp. 2d 757 (S.D. W. Va. 2004); United States v. 
Mueffleman, 327 F. Supp. 2d 79 (D. Mass. 2004); United States v. Croxford, 324 F. Supp. 2d 1230 (D. 
Utah 2004); United States v. Schaefer, 384 F.3d 326, 330 (7th Cir. 2004).
88
 The Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuit courts declared the Guidelines unconstitutional before the 
Booker decision.  See, e.g., United States v. Mooney, 2005 WL 696909 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Ameline, 376 F.3d 967 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v. Montgomery, 2004 WL 1562904 (6th Cir. 2004); 
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004).  Other circuits have found the Guidelines to be 
consistent with the constitution.  See United States v. Koch, 383 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2004); United States v. 
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C. Remedial Opinion
Although many anticipated that the Court would have to revert to an advisory 
system in light of the Blakely and Apprendi decisions, the surprise segment of the Booker
opinion was the excision of two sections of the Guidelines.89 Once the Court determined 
the aspect of the Guidelines that implicated the Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant, it 
excised the unconstitutional portion of the Guidelines and retained the essence of what 
makes the Guidelines a viable punishment tool.90  The Court determined that 
implementation of the substantive opinion required the excision of 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 3553(b)(1) (providing that courts “shall” impose a guidelines sentence)91 and 3742(e)
(setting forth standards of appellate review),92 both of which were “incompatible with 
today’s constitutional holding.”93 Since section 3553(b)(1) is the provision that makes 
the Guidelines mandatory, without it the Guidelines become advisory in all future cases.
Notably, the excision was done with the goal of preserving the entirety of the 
remainder of the SRA.  “The remainder of the Act ‘function[s] independently.’”94 The 
Court was explicit: “Section 3553(a) remains in effect, and sets forth numerous factors 
that guide sentencing.  Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, as they have in 
the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.”95
Hammound, No. 03-4253, slip op. (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 2004); United States v. Pineiro, 377 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 
2004).
89
 Speaking for the Blakely dissenters, Justice O’Conner observed that
[t]he consequences of today’s decision will be as far reaching as they are disturbing.  
Washington’s sentencing system is by no means unique.  Numerous other States have 
enacted Guidelines systems, as has the Federal Government. (Citations omitted.) 
Today’s decision casts constitutional doubt over them all and, in so doing, threatens an 
untold number of criminal judgments. Every sentence imposed under such Guidelines in 
cases currently pending on direct appeal is in jeopardy. And despite the fact that we hold 
in Schriro v. Summerlin, ante ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 2519, that Ring does not apply 
retroactively on habeas review, all criminal sentences imposed under the federal and state 
Guidelines since Apprendi was decided in 2000 arguably remain open to collateral attack.
124 S. Ct. at 2548-49.
90
 125 S. Ct. at 756-57.
91 Section 3553(b)(1) states that courts “shall impose a sentence . . . within the range.”  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(b)(1) (2000) (emphasis supplied).
92 Section 3742(e) provides for a de novo standard of review which is dependant on “the Guidelines’
mandatory nature.”  18 U.S.C. § 3742 (2000).  This provision came about after the enactment of the 
PROTECT Act in 2003.  This law revised the standard for appellate review, and it has been declared 
invalid by the Booker decision.
93 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
94 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764 (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
95 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 766.
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The use of section 3553(a) as a guide has taken center stage in the immediate 
future of federal sentencing.96  There are two possible extremes: afford Guidelines the 
heaviest deference, adhering closely to Guidelines as though they are still mandatory 
“except in the exceptional case.”97  On the other hand, courts might celebrate in the 
advisory nature of the Guidelines, intending to avoid them at all costs and sentence 
according to individual whim.98  Either interpretation is a violation of the spirit and 
holding of Booker.
III. Defining Reasonableness
In fixing the Blakely problem, the Supreme Court in Booker determined to retain 
the essence of the guidelines as advisory while eliminating the mandatory obligations.  In 
rectifying the constitutional infirmity, the Court assigned the appellate courts the duty of 
reviewing sentences for “reasonableness.”  One reaction to this holding is to anticipate a 
return to the pre-Guidelines discrepancies in sentencing, including the return of 
unwarranted disparities.  Alternatively, opponents of an advisory guidelines system might 
perceive that this system is inherently inferior to a presumptive or mandatory system.99
Neither of these expectations need be true.
A. Reasonableness
The Supreme Court replaced the mandatory Guidelines with a more flexible 
approach to punishment: a “practical standard of review already familiar to appellate 
courts: review for ‘unreasonable[ness].’”100 The “reasonableness” of a sentence will be 
the determining factor in future cases and courts will have to carve the way in this new 
96
 See discussion infra Part V.
97
 United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 2005).
98
 One court coined this approach “the free at last” view, a return to pre-1984 indeterminate sentencing.  
See United States v. Jaber, 2005 WL 605787, 4 (D. Mass. 2005).
99
 Legal observers have expressed “concerns from proponents of prescriptive guidelines and from 
opponents of guidelines generally that advisory systems were ineffective or more trouble than they were 
worth.  These concerns were based on a perception of the superior effects of prescriptive systems and of the 
inferior outcomes of advisory ones.”  Kim S. Hunt & Michael Connelly, Advisory Guidelines in the Post-
Blakely Era, ABA WHITE COLLAR CRIMES PUBLICATION F-11 (2005).  The authors compare the federal 
system to state advisory sentencing schemes and conclude that the advisory system can be an effective 
sentencing tool.  “Although some commentators have questioned the efficacy of advisory systems in 
addressing sentencing disparity and predictability, this article will show that, properly constituted and 
overseen, these systems have produced results in many ways comparable it those of prescriptive sentencing 
systems, which themselves have not always achieved or sustained the ambitious goals they have set.”  Id. at 
F-12.
100 Booker, ___ U.S. at ___, 125 S. Ct. at 765.
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era of post-Booker sentencing.  Reasonableness is a sufficiently flexible standard that will 
allow a court to sentence within the guidelines or depart when warranted.
Reasonableness, the heart of all future sentencing,101 “requires a sentencing court 
to consider Guidelines ranges . . . but it permits the court to tailor the sentence in light of 
other statutory concerns as well.”102  Specifically, the Booker Court stated:
Without the “mandatory” provision, the Act nonetheless requires judges to 
take account of the Guidelines together with other sentencing goals. . . . 
The Act . . . requires judges to consider the Guidelines sentencing range 
established for . . . the applicable category of offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant, the pertinent Sentencing Commission
policy statements, the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities, 
and the need to provide restitution to victims.  And the Act . . . requires 
judges to impose sentences that reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate 
deterrence, protect the public, and effectively provide the defendant with 
needed educational or vocational training and medical care.103
The fact that reasonableness will govern sentencing does not mean that the 
Guidelines will no longer be relevant or influential over the judiciary.  Rather, courts will 
be able to craft a sentence that achieves the goals of the SRA whether the sentence be 
within or outside of the Guidelines.  Rote sentencing has been eliminated.
Once judicial fact-determinations are omitted, the judge must rely on other 
discretionary factors in order to craft a reasonable sentence.
We have never doubted the authority of a judge to exercise broad 
discretion in imposing a sentence within a statutory range. . . . For when a 
trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a 
defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the 
facts that the judge deems relevant.104
It appears that a judge can avoid a Sixth Amendment violation if he exercises 
genuine sentencing discretion.  Even though the Guidelines are now advisory, courts 
must still consult the Guidelines when assessing the appropriate sentence to be imposed.  
101
 Sentencing is likely to revolve once again should Congress take the invitation of the Court to act on this 
decision.
102 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3553 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 991 et seq.).
103 Id. at 764-65.  See also United States v. West, 2005 WL 180930, at *3, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1123, at 
*7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2005) (“[n]othing in Booker appears to suggest that such fact-finding, as limited by 
the principles of Apprendi and its progeny, is inappropriate.”).
104 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 750 (Stevens, J.).
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The “district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those 
Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”105
The correct determination of what is and is not reasonable will be the challenge 
for courts in the immediate future as they attempt to comply with Booker’s limitations, 
while at the same time exercising more sentencing discretion than they have since 1984.  
Some courts have decreed that they will give “serious” consideration to the Guidelines
ranges when sentencing.106  Regardless of the amount of deference a court gives to the 
Guidelines, the court should create a record which supports the sentence imposed.
Other post-Booker sentencing courts have “considered” the Guidelines when 
sentencing even though the ultimate sentence is outside of the sentencing range.107  There 
is a danger that courts will offer a passing reference to the Guidelines in order to consider 
them, but without true meaningful reference.108  Courts which carefully consider both the 
Guidelines and the individual circumstances of the defendant and the crime will be able 
to withstand appellate scrutiny of the sentence imposed.109  There is a strong likelihood 
that punishment which considers all of the factors that were eliminated by the mandatory 
guidelines system will better reflect justice than the rote sentences that preceded Booker.
1. “Great Weight”
105 Id. at 767.
106 United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 19, 2005).  The court also warned that 
“Booker is not an invitation to do business as usual.”  Id. at 987.
107 United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 119 (2d Cir. 2005).  The Crosby court was the first to evaluate 
the Booker decision for the Second Circuit.  The court attempted to provide general guidance to the lower 
courts of the circuit, but it declined to define “consideration,” instead leaving this interpretation to evolve in 
future sentencing.  See generally id.
108 Crosby, 397 F.3d at 111.  The judge noted that a court cannot satisfy its duty to consider the Guidelines
by a generic reference to them when sentencing. Id.
109
 Courts should not speculate what a lower court would likely do, since the sentencing framework is now 
completely different.  Courts that are considering whether to re-sentence a defendant who was sentenced in 
the interim between Blakely and Booker will most likely have to sentence anew.  Both the defendant and 
the government should be given the opportunity to present all relevant sentencing factors to the court.  A 
judge would be challenged to discern what sentence a district judge “would have imposed . . . in the 
absence of mandatory Guidelines and de novo review of downward departures.”  United States v. Ruiz-
Alonso, 397 F.3d 815 (9th Cir. 2005). The “fundamental difference between the pre-and post-Booker
sentencing frameworks illustrates our deep concern with speculating, based merely on a middle-of-the-
range sentence imposed under the mandatory Guidelines framework, that the district court would not have 
sentenced [the defendant] to a lower sentence under the advisory Guidelines regime.”  United States v. 
Barnett, 398 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005).
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In United States v. Wilson,110 the court afforded the Guidelines “heavy weight, 
and suggested that any deviation from the Guidelines could occur only in “unusual cases 
for clearly identified and persuasive reasons.”111 This view is bolstered by the language 
in Booker that “[t] he district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines , must 
consult those Guidelines and take them into account when sentencing.”112 The position 
that Guidelines are presumed valid is flawed and quite possibly a constitutional violation 
of the Booker holding.  A sentence that automatically adheres to the Guidelines except in 
exceptional cases is quite likely per se unreasonable.
The flaw with the Wilson court’s view is that the Guidelines were never meant to 
be blindly followed.  Congress and the Commission envisioned a true advisory capacity 
for the Guidelines.  It was anticipated that a common law of sentencing would develop 
with the lower and appellate courts refining what worked and what failed.  The SRA at its 
inception contemplated incorporation of section 3553(a) factors to individualize 
sentences.  Instead, sentencing has evolved with robotic calculation, a result surely not 
intended by the SRA.
Heavy deference to the Guidelines without more reasoned sentencing does 
nothing to recognize the reasoning and holding of Booker and cases that led to its 
opinion.  Affording great weight to Guidelines continues to treat them as if their 
mandatory status survived Booker.  This deferential approach runs counter to the 
holding in Booker which specifically rendered the Guidelines advisory.  Rather 
than continue to support the much criticized Guidelines, Booker carved a new 
path by resurrecting discretion, urging courts to “consider” the Guidelines when 
sentencing.  This approach allows a court to address all, not just some, of the 
goals of the SRA.
The Wilson approach to the weight of the guidelines is in conflict with the 
directives of Booker, as Justice Scalia explains in his dissent:
110
 United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910, 912, 925 (D. Utah 2005).  See also United States v. 
Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269 (D. Utah 2005) (reaffirming the Wilson and addressing critics of the first 
Wilson opinion).
111 Id.
112 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 767 (emphasis supplied).
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Thus logic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge, after considering the 
recited factors (including the guidelines), has full discretion, as full as what he 
possessed before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory 
range.  If the majority thought otherwise – if it thought the Guidelines not only 
had to be ‘considered’ (as the amputated statute requires) but has generally to be 
followed – its opinion would surely say so.113
2. Ignoring the Guidelines
The fact that the Guidelines are now advisory rather than mandatory presents 
problems for courts which had serious disagreement with the Guidelines ’
implementation.  Courts are now permitted to exercise judicial discretion and consider 
the Guidelines, but they must also tailor a sentence with the policies and purposes of the 
SRA in mind.  Jurists have voiced concerns that courts might ignore the Guidelines and 
the sentence that results will not be bound by reason and thus not reasonable.
If one does not give the Guidelines “deference,” “considerable weight,” a 
“presumption of correctness,” or some similar significance, what does one 
do to harmonize and implement the vaunted statutory goals of sentencing 
that Judge Pratt and others use, cafeteria style, to do justice? If one reads 
the decisions of judges who give the Guidelines and their ranges no 
particular significance (“weight”), one is, sadly, left with the conclusion 
that well-meaning sentences are now being imposed with little or no 
coherent organizing principles. One day it may be deterrence (general or 
specific). Another day it might be “just punishment” that catches our 
fancy. On the third day we may be seen as promoting “respect for the 
law.” Of course, we never want a sentence longer than necessary. And so 
on, and so on.  We end up selecting the sentencing goal(s) of the day (and 
thus the sentence of the moment) with much the same whimsy and lack of 
coherence as children picking the flavor of the day at the ice cream 
shop.114
Courts should not read Booker to indicate that they can virtually ignore the 
Guidelines and return to a time of absolute discretion in sentencing.  This perspective 
would also violate the Booker decision, which left intact the majority of the Guidelines
provisions.  For one thing, this would resurrect some of the very pitfalls that resulted in 
the passage of the SRA initially, such as discrepancies and lack of uniformity.  One court 
has cautioned that courts should not view Booker as a return to the “‘free at last’ regime, 
113
 Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 791. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
114
 This view was expressed by Judge Kopf who cautioned his colleagues against giving their own 
idiosyncratic sense of justice.  United States v. Wanning, 4:03CR3001-1 (D. Neb. 2005).
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or a return to pre-1984 indeterminate sentencing.”115  Judges who are inclined to 
disregard the guidelines might do so in order to favor their own personal agenda of the 
policies and goals supporting sentencing, a result not contemplated by Booker.
3. “Consideration”
The question of what “consideration” a court should give to the Guidelines arose 
in the United States v. Crosby case.116  The Court stated that sentencing courts are 
“entitled to find all of the facts that the Guidelines make relevant to the determination of 
a Guidelines sentence and all of the facts relevant to the determination of a non-
Guidelines sentence.”117  The Crosby court declined to fashion a bring-line rule, such as 
that announced in Wilson.  Rather, Crosby stated that lower courts should “consider” the 
Guidelines when sentencing a defendant.  The court welcomed the “concept of 
‘consideration’ in the context of the applicable Guidelines range [and it will] evolve as 
district judges faithfully perform their statutory duties.”118  As the Crosby court noted, “a 
sentencing judge would violate the Sixth Amendment by making factual findings and
mandatorily enhancing a sentence above the range applicable to facts found by a jury or 
admitted by a defendant.”119  The extent to which a lower court will “consider” the 
guidelines is directly connected with the imposition of “reasonable” sentences.120
A well-reasoned approach to the post-Booker sentencing process is evident in the 
case of United States v. Ranum,121 where the court aligned the remedial majority of 
Booker to the factors set forth in section 3553(a).  The court recognized that serious 
consideration must be afforded to the guidelines, but cautioned that “in doing so courts 
should not follow the old ‘departure’ methodology.”  Rather, courts 
need not justify a sentence outside of the [guidelines] by citing factors that take 
the case outside the ‘heartland.’  Rather, courts are free to disagree, in individual 
cases and in the exercise of discretion, with the actual range proposed by the 
guidelines, so long as that the ultimate sentence is reasonable and carefully 
supported by reasons tied to the § 3553(a) factors.
115 Jaber, No. 02-CR-10201-NG at 9.
116 United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
117 Id. at 112.
118 Id. at 113.
119 Id. at 114.
120 Id. at 119, see reasonableness discussion, Part IV, infra.
121
 353 F. Supp. 2d 984, 986 (E. D. Wis. 2005).
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This court noted that the Wilson approach was inconsistent with the remedial Booker
majority opinion which “direct[s] courts to consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, many of 
which the guidelines either reject or ignore.”122
B. How advisory are the Guidelines?
The Guidelines are now only one factor (number 3) on a list of five possible 
factors for courts to consider when sentencing.  Courts must consider all of the factors 
listed in section 3553(a):
1. the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 
of the defendant;
2. the kinds of sentence available;
3. the guidelines and policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, 
including the advisory guidelines range;
4. the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparity; and 
5. the need to provide restitution where applicable.123
Courts must not slide easily back into a posture that any sentence within the Guidelines is 
presumed to be reasonable, while any sentence outside of the Guidelines is presumed to 
be unreasonable.  Thus, one court warned, “[t]o treat the Guidelines as presumptive is to 
concede the converse, i.e., that any sentence imposed outside the Guidelines range would 
be presumptively unreasonable in the absence of clearly identified factors . . . [and] 
making the Guidelines, in effect, still mandatory.”124  To assign presumptive 
reasonableness to post-Booker sentencing simply because it follows the advisory 
guidelines would be a misreading of the Booker rationale.  The guidelines should be a 
“useful starting point in fashioning a just and appropriate sentence,” but need not dictate 
the sentence actually imposed.125 Booker is not an “invitation to do business as usual.”126
122
 Id. at 986.
123
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(3), (a)(5)-(7). Section 3553(a)(2) sets forth the purposes of sentencing and 
contains overriding principles governing all sentences. Section (a)(2) factors identify the purposes of 
punishment: retribution; deterrence; incapacitation; and rehabilitation.  These are discussed more fully in 
Part V, infra.
124 United States v. Myers, 353 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 26, 2005).  The Court also observed that 
Booker is “an invitation, not to unmoored decision making, but to the type of careful analysis of the 
evidence that should be considered when depriving a person of his or her liberty.”  Id.
125 United States v. Bihieri, 356 F. Supp. 2d 589, 2005 WL 350585 (E.D. Va. 2005).  The sentencing court 
sentenced the defendant to a sentence within the guidelines’ range, but rejected the presumption of “heavy 
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On the other hand, some courts will view the guidelines as dismantling all that 
preceded their enactment.  Courts which take the position that the guidelines have been 
tossed aside in favor of a completely discretionary sentencing scheme are equally 
misguided.  Booker does not mean a “regime without rules or a return to the standardless 
sentencing regime which preceded the SRA.”127 Courts can be informed by the 
guidelines and all of their history, but they should still “consider” the guidelines when 
imposing sentence.  The amount of consideration remains to be worked out through a 
flexible use of the advisory guidelines in setting a sentence.
Consideration of the Guidelines allows courts to craft sentences by reference to 
the Guidelines scheme without being bound by it.
Since there were no alternative rules prior to the Sentencing Guidelines –
no empirical studies linking particular sentences to particular crime 
control objectives, no common law of sentencing – and there have been 
none since, the Guidelines will continue to have a critical impact. . . . 
[T]he only way for courts to truly “consider” the Guidelines, rather than to 
follow them by rote, is to do in each case just what the Commission failed 
to do – to explain, correlate to the purposes of sentencing, cite to 
authoritative sources, and be subject to appellate review.128
Regardless of the way in which the court labels the deference to the guidelines, a 
sentencing court can achieve its goals of sentencing as well as the goals articulated by the 
SRA after Booker.
When a sentencing court considers the guidelines the judge can hand out a 
sentence that is either within or outside of the guidelines by using the tools that the 
guidelines provide.  Courts have already used these methods to achieve just sentences in 
the early post-Booker world.129
IV. Departures and Substantial Assistance
Booker will cause a re-evaluation of the sentencing concepts that have gained 
acceptance in the last twenty years. These concepts will either cease to be relevant or 
weight” assigned the Guidelines by Judge Cassell in United States v. Wilson, 350 F. Supp. 2d 910 (D. Utah 
2005).
126 United States v. Ranum, 353 F. Supp. 2d 984 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
127 Jaber, No. 02-CR-10201-NG at 3.
128 Jaber, No. 02-CR-10201-NG at 22.
129
 The use of section 3553(a) factors has already been a source for district court judges to achieve a just 
sentence under Booker. See discussion, infra Part V.
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transition to assume new meaning and significance in a post-Booker world.  In this 
section, I will discuss the impact that Booker will likely have on departures and 
substantial assistance motions.
A. Departures No Longer Critical
Under section 3553(b) of the Guidelines, departures from the sentencing range 
were permissible only if “there [is] an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, 
or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by . . . the Guidelines.”130 The 
Guidelines ranges were intended to include all relevant information that would form the 
basis for a departure.
Downward occurred in two main categories: substantial assistance motions 
controlled by the government131 and judicially initiated departures for acceptance of 
responsibility132 and minor role in the offense.133 Under the Guidelines, the scope of 
departures is limited and criminal history is not relevant for downward departures,134
except in circumstances where it is relevant under §4A1.3.135 Judges were strictly 
prohibited from reducing the sentence in cases where the defendant’s family 
responsibilities, aberrant behavior, community ties or diminished capacity warrant 
mitigation.136 Now, Booker eliminates this strict interpretation of departures.
It remains to be seen what courts will do in reaction to Booker about the departure 
concept.  Before Booker, departure issues were a major focus of appellate review.137
Now even if no traditional departure is available, a court may still sentence a defendant 
outside of the advisory guidelines in the exercise of discretion under § 3553.  Courts no 
130
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000).
131 U.S.S.G. § 5K.
132 U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2.
133 U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1.
134
 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 () (1)-(2).
135
 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.8
136
 PROTECT Act § 401 (b)(2), 117 Stat. at 668.
137
  The Booker decision eliminated the de novo standard of review for sentences that were passed as part of 
the PROTECT Act.
In 2003 Congress . . . added a de novo standard of review for departures and inserting 
cross-references to 3553(b)(1).  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the 
Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 . . . .  In light of today’s holding, the reasons 
for these revisions – to make Guidelines sentencing even more mandatory than it had 
been – have ceased to be relevant. . . .  Those factors in turn will guide appellate courts, 
as they have in the past, in determining whether a sentence is unreasonable.
125 S. Ct. at 765-66.
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longer have to resort to “departure” or “heartland” analysis in order to achieve an 
appropriate sentence.138 Any liberal departure analysis that might have been reversed 
could now be upheld under Booker’s reasonableness standard and section 3553(a).139
1. Departure Option Remains in the Guidelines
The departure option retains viability as part of the Guidelines structure, and the 
court will continue to take departure methodology into account when sentencing a 
defendant.  Thus, in both setting a sentence and considering a “departure,” courts can 
consult the Guidelines and give greater weight to those factors that would not have been 
considered prior to Booker.140 “Unless the court calculates and then considers what the 
Guidelines advise as to a particular sentence in a particular case – that is, the initial 
Guidelines sentence adjusted by any applicable departures – the court is not in a position 
to follow Booker’s requirements.”141  Thus, courts inevitably will consider the Guidelines 
range when deciding whether the sentence will fall within a range or outside of a range.
Clearly, whether they agree with the Guidelines system or not, lower courts have 
become accustomed to sentencing under that system.  Disagreement with the harshness of 
the Guidelines is not an invitation to ignore them when imposing sentences.  Most judges 
are very familiar with using the Guidelines and they will, for the first time, have the 
opportunity to divert from the ranges in setting sentence.
Under Booker, lower sentencing courts can impose a “reasonable” discretionary 
sentence. In some cases, the Guidelines might provide a reasonable estimation of an 
appropriate sentence for a particular offender.  Sentencing under Booker does not have to 
be whimsical.  Courts can give reasoned consideration to both the offenders and the 
offenses in order to craft an appropriate sentence consistent with Booker.  Courts can, and 
should, refer to the Guidelines when deciding on the appropriate sentence.  On the other 
138
 The old terminology will most likely remain useful to courts as a reference point.  However, courts and 
litigants should refrain from using the Guidelines-focused terminology since it conjures up the mandatory 
nature of the per-Booker sentencing practice.  
139
 Section 3553(a) of the guidelines provides for many factors that were rendered invalid in a mandatory 
sentencing scheme.  See discussion, infra Part V.
140
 “The Guidelines permit departures from the prescribed sentencing range in cases in which the judge 
‘finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. . . .’”  Booker, 125 S. 
Ct. at 750 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004)).
141 United States v. Wilson, 355 F. Supp. 2d 1269, 1285 (D. Utah 2005).  See also United States v. Crosby, 
397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
26
hand, the presumption that the Guidelines apply except in exceptional cases is a clear 
violation of the Booker holding.
After Booker, the departure concept is no longer relevant.  The old departure 
methodology need not control a sentence outside of a Guidelines range because the 
Guidelines are “only one of many factors that a sentencing judge must consider in 
determining an appropriate individualized sentence.”142 The previous departures 
contained in U.S.S.G. § 5K2.0(d) do not constrain a sentencing judge any longer.143
Courts can now consider the Guidelines as advisory and only one factor under section 
3553(a) in setting a sentence.144  A “sentence under this format will not represent a 
‘departure’ under the Guidelines, and will not be considered as a ‘departure’ for purposes 
of reporting or recording the Court’s post-Booker sentence.”145  Thus,
When the judge exercises her discretion to impose a sentence within the 
Guideline range and states for the record that she is doing so, little 
explanation is required. However, when the judge elects to give a non-
Guideline sentence, she should carefully articulate the reasons she 
concludes that the sentence she has selected is appropriate for that 
defendant. These reasons should be fact specific and include, for example, 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to personal 
characteristics of the defendant, his offense conduct, his criminal history, 
relevant conduct or other facts specific to the case at hand which led the 
court to conclude that the sentence imposed was fair and reasonable. Such 
reasons are essential to permit this court to review the sentence for 
reasonableness as directed by Booker.146
2. Warranted Disparities and Individualized Sentencing
Congress did not intend the Guidelines to become rote, mechanical rules that 
bound all judicial discretion.  Rather, “[t]he overriding statutory directive to the 
Sentencing Commission was to eliminate ‘unwarranted disparity.’  The concept of 
disparity that it unwarranted however, is intelligible only in the context of some accepted 
142 United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646, 655-56 (9th Cir. 2005).
143 Id. at 656.
144 United States v. Jones, 353 F. Supp. 2d 22 (D. Me. 2005) (court determined that it could not grant a 
departure, but that it could achieve the same result under section 3553(a) after Booker).
145 United States v. Penniegraft, 357 F. Supp. 2d 854, 857 (D.N.C. 2005).
146 United States v. Mares, 2005 WL 503715, 2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 3653 (5th Cir. Mar. 4, 2005) 
(citations omitted).
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criteria for determining what disparity is warranted – that is, what factors should be taken 
into account in sentencing.”147
Sentencing cannot accomplish legitimate goals when it is absolutely uniform 
nationwide regardless of any justifiable distinctions between defendants or crimes.  Based 
on this principle, the goals of the Commission were to eliminate unwarranted departures, 
not justified or warranted distinctions, and to advance the goals of uniformity and 
proportionality.  Warranted departures are those factors that should be taken into account 
when sentencing.  In drafting the Guidelines, the Commission sought to establish a 
system that maintained fairness and avoided rote application in sentencing practices.  
Instead, the Guidelines that were produced in 1987 became the rigid, mandatory, and 
inflexible rules that have offended the sentencing policies and goals, thus motivating the 
present sentencing overhaul.
A judge faced with two offenders who, on the surface, appear to be identical, will 
now have options that were constrained under the pre-Booker scheme.  This judge can 
consider the many aspects of the crime, the way in which it occurred, the particular 
background of the defendant, and both harm and culpability in reaching an appropriate 
sentence.  Individualized sentencing, by definition, factors in those nuances that are not 
necessarily evident to the neutral observer.  Fundamentally distinct offenders should not 
be treated in an identical manner.  In an advisory system, sentencing these different 
offenders does not cause a problem.  The court can take into consideration the key 
differences between the offenders and make an appropriate adjustment.  Factors such as 
age, harm, the need for rehabilitation, and criminal history can all make a significant 
difference in the outcome of a sentence.
Under the presumptive system, the judge was compelled to seek equal treatment, 
something not necessarily indicative of just punishment. It was difficult for judges to 
reach outside of the presumptive guidelines range to impose a sentence that was just.  
Sentencing theory has circled to the point that uniformity is not necessarily warranted and 
“blind uniformity [can] promote inequality.”148  By reinvigorating judicial discretion, the 
147 JOSE CABRANES & KATE SMITH, FEAR OF JUDGING:  SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
51 (1998).
148 Id. at 141-42.
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sentencing process will reduce the prosecutorial discretion and control that was inherent 
in the mandatory system.149
Because the Guidelines are no longer mandatory, the Guidelines range is “only 
one of many factors that a sentencing court must consider in determining an appropriate 
individualized sentence.”150  Thus, a court need not be concerned with “departures” from 
a range in order to arrive at the sentence.  A court may consider many factors and is not 
limited to those factors that had governed departures under U.S.S.G § 5K2.0(d).  The 
concept of a “departure” applies in situations where a mandatory range is the only option.  
Once the Guidelines are advisory, the notion of a departure is somewhat of a misnomer.
3. Unwarranted Disparities – Crack/Cocaine
It is now evident that the increased criminalization effort has failed to produce the 
desired results in decreasing the amount of crime.  Notably, the war on drugs has been a 
documented failure.151 The underlying reasons for the drug war and the intended targets 
of the war are seldom those same individuals who are ultimately convicted and sentenced 
to prisons.152 Current federal drug policies coupled with the massive number of 
immigration cases in Border States have swelled the national prison and jail population to 
149
 Judicial discretion will moderate prosecutorial power because judges can consider many more factors 
than they could otherwise consider under a mandatory system.  While prosecutors would urge the court to 
adhere to the Guidelines and sentence offenders to a “range” even where there are key differences between 
offenders, under an advisory system the judge can balance the disparate treatment and achieve a semblance 
of individualized justice.
150 Ameline, 400 F.3d at 655-56.
151The “war on drugs” has been a failure as it has not decreased the amount of drug abuse or criminal 
importation of massive quantities of drugs.  Moreover, the drug policies have had a disproportionate impact 
on minorities by virtue of the disparity between the harshness of punishment for crack as opposed to 
cocaine.
152
 The war on drugs was designed to convict “kingpins” or those large-scale drug importers and 
distributors.  However, in reality the small-scale drug dealers are the ones clogging the prisons.  In fact, it is 
not uncommon for the girlfriends and minor conspirators to receive a harsher sentence under the Guidelines 
than the major operators given that the minor players have no assistance to offer the government in 
exchange for a lighter sentence.  The low-level dealers are the easiest targets, allowing investigators to 
increase their statistics simply by observing a street corner in a minority neighborhood to arrest many small 
time dealers in quantity.  A full-blown investigation into the importation of drugs, by major international 
crime figures, takes much more time, person power, and resource commitment.  The resulting conviction 
rate will not reflect the intensity of the time and effort put forth to capture and prosecute such individuals.  
It is obvious to observers that the government is much better getting many small-time drug dealers and 
girlfriends than spinning its wheels to go after the major players.  Sterling, supra note 35, at 383, 411 (the 
author notes that Congressional intent was to address the mandatory minimums for drug dealing to combat 
the kingpins.  Instead, the reality has been that the laws allow prosecutors to snare the lowest level targets 
in the drug hierarchy).  Mandatory minimums for small quantities of drugs allow the government to gain 
convictions and statistics that support the claim that the drug war is being effectively waged and won.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art14
29
over two million.153 There is a serious disconnect between the laws targeting certain 
segments of major criminality and the individuals who are ultimately imprisoned by these 
same laws. As a result, sentencing practices have produced various anomalies that have 
outraged many observers because they are disproportional.154  The objectives of many of 
the criminal laws and the reality of the sentencing scheme are often not allied.
The Guidelines system increased, instead of decreasing, the racial disparity 
among offenders.  A pertinent example is the crack/cocaine sentencing disparity resulting 
in the imposition of a 100-1 sentencing scheme in cases involving underlying criminal 
conduct related to crack rather than the powder form of cocaine.155  Moreover, between 
1984 and 2001, the average punishment for blacks has grown to be thirty months longer 
than the punishment for white felons.156  Despite repeated calls for reform, this onerous 
provision of our drug laws has remained with us and accounts for much of the 
tremendous increase in the prison population.157  Rather than reduce disparities, the 
guidelines have made the situation worse.  
After almost twenty years of experience, the Sentencing Commission recently 
concluded that, “the sentencing guidelines and mandatory minimum statutes have a 
greater adverse impact on Black offenders than did the factors taken into account by 
judges in the discretionary system in place immediately prior to guidelines 
implementation.”158  In addition, the United States Sentencing Commission recently 
153
 Report, ABA Justice Kennedy Commission Task Force, 16 (2004), available at www.abanet.org/
leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/121A.doc.
154
 Convicted individuals are receiving disproportionate sentences for minor crimes.  See, e.g., Lockyear v. 
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (defendant struck out on his third conviction and received 50 years to life for 
2 petty thefts of video tapes).
155
 In fact, Duncan Fanfan was initially facing 63-78 months for 500 grams of powder cocaine, while 
Freddie Booker faced a range of 210-262 month for 50 grams of crack cocaine.  The differences between 
these two sentencing ranges points out the discrepancy between how crack and powder cocaine are viewed 
under the current sentencing policies. 
156
 United States Sentencing Commission, Report, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, ch. 4, 4 (Nov. 
2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/chap4.pdf.
157 See Report, ABA Justice Kennedy Commission Task Force, 16 (2004), available at www.abanet.org/
leadership/2004/annual/dailyjournal/121A.doc; ABA Report, The Federalization of Criminal Law (1998), 
available at http://www.nacdl.org/public/nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/ $FILE/fedcrimlaw2.pdf.
158
 United States Sentencing Commission, Report, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, ch. 4, 23 (Nov. 
2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/chap4.pdf.
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observed that “the harms associated with crack cocaine do not justify its substantially 
harsher treatment compared to powder cocaine.”159
Before Booker, judges lacked the ability to adjust the inherent unfairness between 
the sentences given to crack offenders compared with the sentences given to cocaine 
offenders.  At a 100-1 ratio, the harshness has been the subject of much study and 
condemnation.160  In a post-Booker sentencing world, judges can now consider whether 
the defendant’s conviction justifies this harshness.161  One court explained the new 
options a sentencing judge will be able to exercise:
As is now notorious, the guidelines create a 100 to 1 ratio between crack 
and powder cocaine. In other words, the guidelines treat possession of 50 
grams of crack cocaine the same as they treat possession of 5000 grams (5 
kilograms) of powder cocaine. Courts, commentators and the Sentencing 
Commission have long criticized this disparity, which lacks persuasive 
penological or scientific justification, and creates a racially disparate 
impact in federal sentencing. . . . To its great credit, the Commission has 
repeatedly sought to reduce the disparity. * * * Only Congress can correct 
the statutory problem, but after Booker district courts need no longer 
blindly adhere to the 100:1 guideline ratio.162
In the wake of Booker, several district courts have invalidated the
punishment disparity between crack and powder cocaine.  When sentencing 
defendants convicted of violations involving crack cocaine, these judges have 
imposed sentences that fall below the ranges set forth under the mandatory 
Guidelines structure.163
159
 U. S. Sentencing Commission, Fifteen Years of Guidelines Sentencing, pp. xv-xvi (Nov. 2004).  This 
report is available online at http://www.ussc.gov/15_year/15year.htm
160
 Although the Guidelines were intended to eliminate the disparity among sentences and defendants, they 
have failed to do so regarding race.  Douglas C. McDonald & Kenneth E. Carlson, Sentencing in the 
Federal Courts: Does Race Matter? (The Transition to Sentencing Guidelines, 1986-1990), Bureau of 
Justice Statistics 1994.  The Guidelines have neglected to remedy the crack/cocaine disparity.  An offender 
convicted of selling crack receives the same sentence as one convicted of selling 100 time the amount of 
cocaine.  See Charles J. Ogletree, The Significance of Race in Sentencing, 6 F ED. SENT. R. 229 (1994).
161 United States v. Smith, No. 02-CR-163 (E.D. Wis. 2005).
162 Id. The court used a 20:1 ratio and sentenced the defendant below the Guidelines.
163
 Unites States v. Harris, 2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 3958 (D. D. C. Mar. 7, 2005) (referring to the Sentencing 
Commission’s observations on the disparity between crack and powder cocaine, the court found them to be 
“sound authority” for the conclusion that the crack guidelines are “greater than necessary”); Simon v. 
United States, 2005 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 34551 (E. D. N. Y. Mar. 17, 2005) (court recognized the disparity 
between crack and powder cocaine and sentenced below the guideline range); United States v. Smith, 2005 
WL 549057. *6- *10 (E. D. Wis. Mar. 3, 2005) (court conducted an in-depth analysis of case law and 
analysis and stated that the 1 to 100 ratio lacks justification and creates unwarranted sentencing disparity.)
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B. Substantial Assistance
1. Determinate Sentencing and Governmental Power
Critics of blind mandatory sentencing have long recognized that offenders could 
be given the same sentence despite the fundamental differences between them.  Blind 
uniformity in sentencing can frequently deny rather than enhance justice.164  Because 
mandatory Guidelines transferred tremendous power into the hands of prosecutors, 
reinvigorating judicial discretion should have the positive outcome of moderating 
prosecutorial discretion.
One of the more unexpected outcomes of the Guidelines system was the increase 
in prosecutorial power. The tremendous growth in prosecutorial power in the last two 
decades was halted with the Booker decision.  Pleas will become less predictable, 
translating into less power for DOJ.165  Despite the many positives brought about by the 
Guidelines, they are not, nor have they ever been, comprehensive and accurate statements 
of appropriate sentences in all cases falling within their ranges. Neither were the 
Guidelines intended to create enhanced discretion in the hands of prosecutors.
Over the last several years, sentencing decisions have quietly shifted from the 
courts to the prosecutors and even to the police and investigators who are involved at the 
initial stages of a criminal investigation.  Executive control of sentencing is initiated well 
before the matter reaches the courtroom.166  Prosecutors maintained the traditional 
powers such as the power to either refuse to prosecute167 or to structure the charges in 
such a way that the outcome is almost certain and a specific sentence almost 
164 CABRANES & SMITH, supra note 136, at 105.  The authors argue that uniformity “can itself be 
‘unwarranted:’ when unprincipled, blind uniformity promotes inequality.”  Id. at 106.
165
 DOJ urges that the courts run the sentencing options through the Guidelines to determine whether they 
are reasonable or not.  This approach runs afoul of Booker because it assumes that a Guidelines sentence is 
reasonable.  By implication, a non-Guidelines sentences is per se unreasonable under this approach, a clear 
violation of Booker.
166
 For example, even in cases where the legislature desires effective enforcement, the police can foil 
enforcement by either refusing to investigate an offense or diverting the action to a less onerous result 
outside of the court system, with street bargaining or formal diversion programs.
167
 Prosecutor discretion is quite broad and essentially unreviewable.  See Leslie C. Griffin, The Prudent 
Prosecutor, 14 GEO. J.L. ETHICS 259 (2001).  A prosecutor can divert an investigation into a civil case and 
the payment of a fine, misdemeanor action, or decline the case altogether.  There are numerous avenues of 
diversion depending on the type of case.  These types of diversions, to the extent that they avoid criminal 
prosecution, are not challenged by the defense for obvious reasons.  Moreover, the public is unlikely to be 
made aware of these day-to-day realities except in cases that rise to public attention.  Thus, prosecutors can 
fashion not only the scope, charges, and benefits to be awarded to a prospective defendant, but they directly 
control the sentence to be imposed upon conviction.  Id.
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guaranteed.168 Prosecutors have the ability to fast-track cases, file misdemeanors, define 
the scope of monetary impact for purposes of restitution and guideline categorization, and 
decide on the number of charges to be filed.
The Guidelines established a new era of prosecutorial control because a sentence 
could be pre-determined by reference to the Guidelines.  Crafting an indictment with a 
certain monetary loss, or a quantity of drugs, or number of victims could have dramatic 
consequences for a defendant’s sentence because the characterization placed the criminal 
activity in certain specific guideline ranges.  Charge bargaining became the currency in 
federal criminal practice.  Further, a prosecutor could choose to ignore conduct that 
would trigger mandatory minimum sentences in favor of a theory allowing a favorable 
substantial assistance sentencing motion.
There is no doubt that crime legislation became more draconian in the past 20 
years with the enactment of thousands of new criminal laws.169  Massive federalization of 
crime has been widely criticized as an unwarranted extension by the federal government 
into the province of the states.  The dramatic surge in overall prison population has 
astounded legal observers at the highest levels and is a national and international 
disgrace.170  Nevertheless, Congress shows no signs of retreating from its approach to 
infuse federal crime into almost every aspect of life.171
168
 Prosecutorial power is almost unlimited.  Today there are more federal laws than ever, and the 
federalization of the criminal justice system has been the subject of much debate and discussion.  Federal 
prosecutors are some of the most powerful actors in the system since they can derail an investigation 
without the obligation to justify such action.  Exceptions are tax cases or other cases where the U.S. 
Attorney must report to the AG if a declination decision is made.
169
 “So large is the present body of federal criminal law that there is no conveniently accessible, complete 
list of federal crimes.”  ABA Report, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 9 (1998), available at
http://www.nacdl.org/public/nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$FILE/fedcrimlaw2.pdf.
170
Were we to enter the hidden world of punishment, we should be startled by what we see.  
Consider its remarkable scale.  The nationwide inmate population today is about 2.1 
million people.  In California, even as we met, this state alone keeps over 160,000 
persons behind bars.  In countries such as England, Italy, France and Germany, the 
incarceration rate is about 1 in 1,000 persons.  In the United States it is about 1 in 143.
Anothony M. Kennedy, Speech at the ABA Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://www.nacdl.
org/public.nsf/2cdd02b415ea3a64852566d6000daa79/departures/$FILE/Justice_Kennedy_ABA_Speech.p
df.
171
 ABA Report, The Federalization of Criminal Law, 9 (1998), available at http://www.nacdl.org/public/
nsf/legislation/overcriminalization/$FILE/fedcrimlaw2.pdf.  The number and extent of crimes has grown so 
much in recent years that the ABA Task Force cautioned that “it is crucial that the American justice system 
not be harmed in the process. . . .  In the end, the ultimate safeguard for maintaining this valued 
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Along with increased federalization, Congress sought to reign in federal court 
judges who were perceived to be sentencing defendants below the guidelines range.  As a 
result of this alarm, Congress passed the PROTECT Act,172 a law premised, in part, on 
the view that federal judges were out of control and granting excessive departures from 
the sentencing Guidelines.173 Despite the alarm sounded over unwarranted judicial 
departures, the evidence establishes that it was not the judiciary, but the executive that 
was initiating over two-thirds of the downward departures.
The United States Sentencing Commission found that, over the time period from 
1991-2001, the percentage of sentences within the Guidelines range decreased from 
80.7% in 1991 to 63.9% in 2001.174  Of those downward departures, two-thirds of them 
were the result of government motions for substantial assistance.175 “Downward 
sentencing departures were more frequently due to prosecutor’s substantial assistance 
motions (28 percent) than for any other reasons (16 percent).”176 During 2001, 
departures accounted for approximately 10,000 out of 60,000 sentences, or roughly 18%.  
Of this number, fully one-fourth of these were initiated by the government.177  Only 25 of 
these were appealed, and the government won 19 of the 25 cases.178 Thus contrary to 
what many observers believed, judicial downward departures were not granted in excess 
constitutional system must be the principled recognition by Congress of the long-range damage to real 
crime control and to the nation’s structure caused by inappropriate federalization.  Id. at 56.
172
 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003).
173 The Feeney amendment to the PROTECT Act was included with a very popular provision designed to 
quickly locate missing children, known as the “Amber Alert” bill.  It passed with an overwhelming support 
in both the House and Senate without the expertise or input of the Sentencing Commission.  The Senate 
vote was 98-0, and the House vote was 400-25.  Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress:  
PROTECT Act, at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN00151:@@@L&summ2=m&.
174
 United States Sentencing Commission, Report to the Congress:  Downward Departures from the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 (Oct. 2003), available at http://www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/
departrpt03.pdf.
175
 The Guidelines provide that the government may file a substantial assistance motion, called a “5K 
motion” in circumstances where the defendant “provided substantial assistance” to the government in its 
investigation.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1.
176
 GAO, Report, Federal Drug Offenses: Departures from Sentencing Guidelines and Mandatory 
Minimums Sentences, Fiscal Years 1991-2001 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/
htext/d04105.htm.
177 Id.
178
 As one federal judge recently observed in a speech to a meeting of the New York Council of Defense 
Lawyers, “That leaves six cases in which the government tried, but failed to overturn a downward 
departure. . . .  So is there really a longstanding [or serious] problem of downward departures?”  Judge 
Pierre N. Leval, Address to the New York Council of Defense Lawyers (Mar. 12, 2004), in N.Y.L.J., 
Mar. 18, 2004.
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or as merciful acts judicial acts.179  The statistics belie the perception that federal judges 
were granting unwarranted sentencing reductions.
2. 5K Motions
A clear example of prosecutorial discretion that troubled many was the substantial 
assistance motion, commonly called the 5K motion.180  This provision, titled Substantial 
Assistance to Authorities, is focused on government control and reads:
Upon motion of the government stating that the defendant has provided 
substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who 
has committed an offense, the court may depart from the guidelines.
(a) The appropriate reduction shall be determined by the court for reasons stated 
that may include, but are not limited to, consideration of the following:
(1) the court’s evaluation of the significance and usefulness of the defendant’s 
assistance, taking into consideration the government’s evaluation of the 
assistance rendered;
(2) the truthfulness, completeness, and reliability of any information or 
testimony provided by the defendant;
(3) the nature and extent of the defendant’s assistance;
(4) any injury suffered, or any danger or risk of injury to the defendant or his 
family resulting from his assistance;
(5) the timeliness of the defendant’s assistance.
The 5K motion is a move for a government-initiated downward departure motion 
for those situations where the defendant has cooperated or offered assistance to the 
government.  In cases where the defendant cooperates, but that cooperation is deemed 
insufficient, the government had the sole option to refuse to file the 5K motion.181  The 
179 See Editorial, House Without Mercy, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 2001, at A20.
180
 U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1.
181
 In United States v. Jaber, the defendant assisted the government, but that assistance was not deemed 
worthy of a substantial assistance motion. 2005 WL 605787, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4028 (D. Mass. 
Mar. 16, 2005).  The judge noted,
With respect to Jaber’s cooperation and acceptance of responsibility, Jaber labored 
mightily to cooperate with the government.  In a sealed affidavit, the defendant revealed 
his considerable efforts to do so.  In Florida, his cooperation did not produce any 
prosecutions, ostensibly because of a change in personnel in the United States Attorney’s 
office.  I cannot give Jaber “credit” for that cooperation simply because I do not have all 
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court had no power to grant any relief and the government had final say whether it was 
satisfied with the defendant’s efforts. 
The problem with this lopsided scenario was that in many cases the low level drug 
offenders were the ones snared in the government’s net.  As a result, they frequently had 
no information to offer as to higher level masterminds.  Our prisons are crowded with this 
type of offender to whom the government did not offer a substantial assistance motion 
since the offender had no assistance to offer.  This most obvious example of a reduction 
of executive power is the fact that defendants no longer will have to depend on the 
government to file a 5K motion for a judge to hear evidence of assistance or other reasons 
for a sentence lower than the Guideline range. 
The government will lose some of its bargaining power in exchanging for 
favorable motions because Booker has mooted the monopoly on substantial assistance 
categories controlled by the government.  Defendants will now be able to seek departures 
from the advisory Guidelines range by petitioning the court directly.  A defendant can 
make a showing to the court that he attempted to cooperate with the government, even if 
the government does not concede that the cooperation is “substantial.”
Judges will continue to consult the Guidelines as a touchstone on sentencing.  
After all, for the last twenty years these mandates have been the cornerstone of federal 
sentencing and influenced most of the states’ sentencing policy.  Sentencing procedures 
after the Booker decision will reduce the ability of the government to control the outcome 
and favor a fair process by giving the judge more, not less, sentencing information.
In an advisory sentencing system a judge will have to explain the different 
sentences imposed on two similarly situated defendants if warranted.182  As long as the 
of the information in the government’s possession.  Nevertheless, Jaber’s repeated efforts 
to help law enforcement surely bear on his extraordinary acceptance of responsibility, 
which is both a Guidelines factor and something that impacts on the likelihood of 
recidivism.
Id.  This was a post-Booker case, so the judge was not bound by the fact that the government did not file a 
5K motion on the defendant’s behalf.
182
 Frequently, a defendant will appear, on the surface, to be similarly situated to another defendant.  
However, under closer inspection, the two defendants will be quite different and warrant distinct 
punishments.  In United States v. Emmenegger, a case dealing with fraud amounts, the judge stated “[i]n 
many cases . . . the amount stolen is a relatively weak indicator of the moral seriousness of the offense or 
the need for deterrence.”  329 F. Supp. 2d 416, 427 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).  Sometimes, the amount of fraud loss 
is dependent on fortuities of the timing of the investigation, the aggressiveness of the government’s 
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sentences are reasonable, an appellate court should have no difficulty upholding the 
sentences as within the sound discretion of the lower courts.183
3. Rebalance of Power
Defense advocacy can now attempt to minimize some of the coercive nature of 
the Guidelines.  This is a welcome return to the traditional status of power between the 
prosecutor and the defense.  A defendant can still seek variances on sentences and the 
judge can still be within the Guidelines because the Guidelines contain departure ranges.
Booker altered the balance of power between the judge, the jury and the 
prosecution.  Because the law allowed the range of possible sentences to be tied to 
judicial fact-finding, the Guidelines failed to satisfy the defendant’s right to a Sixth 
Amendment jury trial.  The traditional balance of power that occurred between an 
executive that charges and the judge that sentences was upset when the prosecutor 
controlled both the charging decision and the likely punishment outcome.  Judicial 
discretion can often be a remedy for the harshness of the punishment or overzealousness 
of the prosecutors.  
Prosecutors are seldom in the best position to adequately determine the 
appropriate sentence as a routine matter.184  Prosecutors lack the discretion or training to 
determine appropriate sentences on a global scale.  Rather, prosecutors are consumed 
with their individual cases, policies, and procedures within a judicial district.  The length 
of a sentence was often driven by the way in which a prosecutor charged the offender. 
When judges are performing their historic and traditional role of imposing 
punishment, they can discern when the punishment does not fit the crime or when the 
individual is a likely candidate for alternative punishment that is not within the 
undercover operation, and the return to victims or even market forces.  Thus, gauging a sentence on amount 
of loss is not necessarily a relevant indicator without reference to other factors.
183 United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 488 (7th Cir. 2005).  In Paladino the government cross-
appealed a sentence that had been reduced from 235 months to 180 months because of rehabilitation and an 
incorrect overstatement of the defendant’s criminal history.  Id. at 480. After Booker, the government 
dropped its cross appeal. Id.  The Seventh Circuit noted that “[u]nder the new sentencing regime the judge 
must justify departing from the Guidelines, and the justification has to be reasonable, but we cannot think 
on what basis a 15-year sentence for Peyton, who was 34 years old when sentenced, could be thought 
unreasonably short.”  Id.
184
 Prosecutors are focused on individual criminal investigations and disputes.  As a result, observers have 
been critical of the power that prosecutors enjoy under the mandatory Guidelines system since they control 
so much of the sentencing outcome, to the exclusion of the judiciary.  Certainly, prosecutorial discretion 
has more potential to produce disparate sentencing treatment than the conduct of the judiciary, if for no 
other reason than the sheer number of prosecutors compared with federal district court judges.
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Guidelines scheme.  The fact that two offenders have an identical offense and prior 
record, although relevant, is not always a compelling reason for identical punishments.  
The offenders may have very different ages, backgrounds, military service, addictions, 
mental capacity, educational levels, and family obligations and may otherwise appear 
dissimilar in ways not visible on the bare record.  Nevertheless, under a mandatory 
system, the judge was obligated to sentence them in the same category, an unwarranted 
result.  
On the other hand, under a mandatory Guidelines sentencing structure, similarly 
situated defendants could actually end up in very different categories depending on 
whether the prosecutor favored one defendant over another.185 The true difference 
between defendants is not always reflected by the scores in a sentencing grid.  Similar 
cases could end up falling within very different ranges.  Two defendants with different 
culpability and who caused different harms could end up in the same sentencing range, 
and this would still be consistent with the mandatory Guidelines structure.  Judges were 
troubled by this confinement since it restricted the sentencing options, and many judges 
had great difficulty in getting a sentence outside of the range set by the Guidelines. 
Given discretionary freedom, many judges will choose to impose sentences tailored to 
each defendant.  There is a greater likelihood of achieving justice in the post-Booker
sentencing scheme than in the mandatory Guidelines system.  As the Supreme Court 
emphasized in Booker, a one-size-fits-all sentence is not the goal.  Rather, the focus 
should be on “similar relationships between sentence and real conduct.”186
V. Section 3553(a) Mandates Individualized Sentencing
Although severing the mandatory section of the Guidelines, the Court left in place 
the adjoining section 3553(a). It reads:
(a) Factors To Be Considered in Imposing a Sentence.—The court shall 
impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the 
purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining 
the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and 
characteristics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed—
185 See Jaber, 2005 WL 605787.
186 125 S. Ct. at 761 (2005).
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(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for 
the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most 
effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available;
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable 
category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines issued by the 
Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994(a)(1) of title 28, 
United States Code, and that are in effect on the date the defendant 
is sentenced; or
(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the 
applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission pursuant to section 994 (a)(3) of title 28, United 
States Code;
(5) any pertinent policy statement issued by the Sentencing Commission 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 994 (a)(2) that is in effect on the date the defendant 
is sentenced;
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants 
with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.187
Section 3553(a) will become the heart of discretionary sentencing after Booker
and allow judges to avoid both the unduly harsh as well as the indefensibly light 
sentences.188  Instead, sentencing should be reasoned, based on the exercise of sound 
discretion, producing more judicious outcomes.  Even the DOJ recognized the 
importance of judicial discretion in sentencing when it directed all federal prosecutors in 
the wake of the Blakely decision to “urge the court to impose sentence, exercising 
traditional judicial discretion, within the applicable statutory sentence range,” with 
187
 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
188
 In the interim between Blakely and Booker, some courts felt constrained to sentence as though the 
Guidelines never existed. One extreme example is the Shamblin case.  United States v. Shamblin, No. 
2-03-00217, 18-19 (D. W. Va. 2004).  A judge sentenced Ronald Shamblin after he pled guilty to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 846, which criminalized a wide ranging conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine.  The court held a 
resentencing hearing pursuant to Rule 35, and after considering all of the factors the defendant’s sentence 
went from life under a pure Guidelines determination, to 240 months with the Apprendi filter, to 12 months 
in a post-Blakely analysis.  In calculating the sentence, the court reached the highest offense level 
permissible on the Guidelines chart of 43.  The maximum statutory sentence was 20 years.  Thus, 
sentencing in light of Apprendi reduced that actual sentence that the judge could impose to 20 years or the 
statutory maximum.  After Blakely, the judge considered the affects of both Apprendi and Blakely.  Based 
only on the sentencing factors that the defendant admitted to during his plea, the court sentenced him to 
6-12 months.  Even the court found this to be an outrageous outcome. Id.
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“recommendation in all such cases . . . that the court exercise its discretion to impose a 
sentence that conforms to a sentence under the Guidelines.”189  The Booker opinion 
restores the original impetus for sentencing overhaul. Booker validates the section 
3553(a) factors that lay dormant under the mandatory guidelines system.
A. The Parsimony Provision
The “parsimony provision” of section 3553 reflects the philosophy that a sentence 
should be “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to meet the objectives of section 
3553(a).  The four purposes of sentencing are those traditional goals of retribution,, 
deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation set forth in 3553(a)(2):
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
This section is critical because it is not simply another factor, but it overrides all of 
section 3553. Thus, this section sets forth an independent limit on what sentence a court 
may impose.  As one court has stated:
I believe that a refusal to depart from the applicable guideline range rises 
to the level of a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). I base this conclusion in part on 
the expressly mandatory language of that provision, in part on well-settled 
administrative law principles imported into the sentencing context by Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and in part on the history, structure, and 
purpose of the SRA considered as a whole.
Section 3553(a) requires--as a matter of law--that district courts impose a 
sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to meet the four purposes of 
sentencing set forth in subsection 3553(a)(2)--retribution, deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation. Imposition of a sentence greater than necessary 
to meet those purposes is therefore a violation of section 3553(a) appealable under 
subsection 3742(a)(1) and reversible under subsection 3742(f)(1). The question 
then becomes whether a sentence imposed pursuant to applicable guidelines could 
ever be greater than necessary to meet the four statutory purposes. I believe that it 
189
 July 2, 2004, Memorandum from James Comey, Deputy Attorney General to all Federal Prosecutors.  
The government wanted to urge the continued use of the Guidelines and it continues to do so after Booker.  
This article argues that to simply continue to follow the Guidelines would be a violation of the principles of 
Booker (emphasis added).
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could.190
One anticipated result from the Booker decision is that courts will view the 
Guidelines as just one of a number of sentencing factors.  Courts can no longer 
robotically apply the Guidelines without considering the individual characteristics of a 
defendant the offense.  The remedial majority in Booker directed sentencing courts to 
consider all of the sentencing factors contained in 3553(a).  Under the prior mandatory 
Guidelines system, these factors were usually ignored in favor of the Guidelines range.  
After all, the judges could not consider any factors, with limited exceptions, since the 
sentence had to fall within the Guidelines range.
This point will become more evident as cases percolate through the post-Booker
sentencing process.  Under section 3553(b), departures are permissible only when “there 
[is] an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by . . . the Guidelines.”  Thus, under the mandatory scheme, 
courts could not consider factors that were already included in departure ranges and 
presumptively taken into consideration by the Commission in establishing the
punishment ranges.  Under U.S.S.G. § 5H, the Guidelines set forth many factors that 
courts were not permitted to consider in setting sentence.191  This prohibition resulted 
from the interpretation of the Guidelines as inclusive of these characteristics and thus, a 
court did not need to go beyond the Guidelines.  Judges hands were tied.
Applying section 3553(a)(1) requires that the court evaluate the “history and 
characteristics” of a defendant.  A defendant’s characteristics and history could include 
190 United States v. Denardi, 892 F. 2d 269, 276-77 (3d Cir. 1989) (Becker, J. concurring in part, dissenting 
in part).
191
 U.S.C.G. § 5H is titled Specific Offender Characteristics.  This policy statement addresses the 
“relevance of certain offender characteristics to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside 
the applicable guideline range and, in certain cases, to the determination of a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range.”  Id.  For the most part, § 5H details those sentencing factors that a court are “not 
ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.”  Id.
Notably, factors that might weigh in favor of a defendant are “not ordinarily relevant,” such as:  age; 
education and vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions; physical condition; including drug or 
alcohol dependence; gambling addiction; employment record; family ties and responsibilities; military, 
civic, charitable or public service; employment-related contributions; record of prior good works; and lack 
of guidance as a youth.  Factors that usually weigh against a defendant are “relevant in determining the 
applicable guideline range,” such as: role in the offense; criminal history; and dependence upon criminal 
activity for a livelihood.  Id.
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other factors such as the defendant’s age,192 education and vocational skills,193 mental and 
emotional condition,194 physical condition,195 employment record,196 family ties and 
responsibilities,197 socio-economic status,198 civic and military contributions199 and his 
lack of guidance as a youth.200 Mandatory Guidelines rejected or ignored these other 
factors as irrelevant to sentencing or already factored into the guideline ranges.201
Rather, sentencing judges routinely considered a defendant’s criminal history, the only 
aspect of the defendant’s history permissible under the Guidelines.
Booker compels courts to broaden consideration of factors which are set forth in 
3553(a).  The court stated that “a sentencing judge would [] violate section 3553(a) by 
limiting consideration of the applicable Guidelines range to the facts found by the jury or 
admitted by the defendant, instead of considering the applicable Guidelines range, as 
required by subsection 3553(a)(4), based on the facts found by the court.”
Restitution demonstrates the relevance of a sentencing factor that was virtually 
ignored under the determinate system.  A defendant required to satisfy a restitution order 
will need to be employed.  Section 3553(a)(7) specifies that a court consider “the need to 
provide restitution to any victims of the offense.”  Courts have interpreted this provision 
as allowing consideration as long as the departures for restitution are within the 
Guidelines range.  Section 3553 did not allow a judge to depart from the Guidelines to 
achieve the purposes of restitution.  Under the mandatory guideline scheme, a court was 
forbidden from departing from the Guidelines in order to facilitate restitution.202 This 
was because the Guidelines had already factored restitution into the ranges set forth under 
192
 U.S.S.G. § 5H1.1.
193 Id. at § 5H1.2.
194 Id. at § 5H1.3.
195 Id. at § 5H1.4.
196 Id. at § 5H1.5.
197 Id. at § 5H1.6.
198 Id. at § 5H1.10.
199 Id. at § 5H1.11.
200 Id. at § 5H1.12.
201
 At least one observer suggested some time ago that the Guidelines and their policies should be only 
factors to consider along with other factors in setting the appropriate sentence.  Daniel J. Freed, Federal 
Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines:  Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J.
1681, 1701-02 (1992).  See also U.S.S.G. § 5H.
202 United States v. Seacott, 15 F.3d 1380, 1388-89 (7th Cir. 1994).
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3E 1.1 acceptance of responsibility.203  Now a judge can consider the need to make the 
victims whole when sentencing the defendant.
Other factors will be critical as well.  In sentencing a defendant below the 
suggested guidelines range, a judge noted how some of these factors will bear upon the 
sentence:
. . . under the circumstances of this particular case . . . the sentence called 
for by the guidelines, 168-210 months, was greater than necessary to 
satisfy the purposes of sentencing set forth in § 3553(a).  In other words, 
while this sentence may be disparate from the sentence given to other 
defendants who are “found guilty of similar conduct,” given the particular 
circumstances of this case – [his] age, the likelihood of recidivism, his 
status as a veteran, his strong family ties, his medical condition, and his 
serious drug dependency – the Court does not view that disparity as being 
“unwarranted.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).204
The excessive sentences that have resulted in an overcrowded prison system will 
eventually even out as judges become more accustomed to being able to consider a wide 
range of sentencing factors.
Courts must now consider all of the § 3553(a) factors, not just the Guidelines, 
since the Guidelines are only one out of five sentencing factors. Where the guidelines 
conflict with other factors set forth in § 3553(a), courts will have to resolve the 
conflicts.”205  Some courts can conduct a detailed analysis of the weight to be afforded 
the section 3553 factors and ultimately diverge from the guidelines.206  Courts, however, 
might conduct this analysis and come out with a sentence squarely within the guidelines 
range.  This is the ultimate demonstration of judicial discretion: the ability to consult 
factors, determine their weight, balance them against a range, and determine an 
appropriate sentence.
B. Full Discretion and Voluntary Guidelines – State Court Precedents
203 The Commentary to § 3E1.1 “demonstrates that the Commission adequately considered restitution as a 
mitigating circumstance when formulating the Guidelines,” id. at 323, and therefore it is not an appropriate 
ground for departure. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (departures are permissible only when “there exists an 
aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
. . . the Guidelines”).  Thus, under the mandatory scheme, courts could not consider factors that were 
already included in departure ranges.
204 United States v. Nellum, No. 2:04-CR-30 PS (N.D. Ind. 2005).
205 United States v. Ranum, No. 04-CR-31 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 14, 2005).
206 Ranum, No. 04-CR-31.  The court offered a roadmap detailing the methodology of post-Booker 
sentencing factors.
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Federal courts can benefit from a number of states that have operated under an 
advisory sentencing system with positive results.  A common theme of these states’
success is the flexibility inherent in the guidelines, the method of appellate review and 
the opportunity for all parties to place on the record the critical sentencing factors.  The 
result in Booker can lead the federal government to a successful transition from a 
mandatory system to an advisory one, by referencing state systems.
For example, judges in Wisconsin sentence by reference to an advisory guidelines 
structure and their sentences are reviewed on appeal for reasonableness.  Wisconsin 
judges must demonstrate the reasons for their sentences and connect these reasons with 
the goals of the sentencing process.207  Thus, the Wisconsin sentencing process 
“contemplates a process of reasoning.”208  This includes a full explanation on the record 
of the reasons for the sentence imposed.209  Courts must not, “merely utter[] the facts, 
invoke[] sentencing factors, and pronounc[e] a sentence. . . .  Such an approach confuses 
the exercise of discretion with decision-making.210 In this way, Wisconsin is similar to 
the post-Booker sentencing structure and provides a clue to the expected effectiveness 
and potential success.
Section 3553(c) requires district courts to continue to state the reasons for the 
sentence imposed because Booker left section 3553(c) in place.211  A sentence that is 
supported by specific written justification will likely be found to satisfy the 
“reasonableness” requirement of Booker.  “Post-Booker we continue to expect district 
judges to provide reasoned explanation for their sentencing decisions in order to facilitate 
appellate review.”212
207
 See Hunt & Connelly, supra note 99, at F-21.  The authors review advisory sentencing states and 
explain the perceived strengths of advisory sentencing systems.
208 State v. Gallion, 678 N.W.2d. 197 (2004).
209
 “In all Anglo-American jurisprudence a principal obligation of the judge is to explain the reasons for his 
actions. His decisions will not be understood by the people and cannot be reviewed by the appellate courts 
unless the reasons for decisions can be examined. It is thus apparent that requisite to a prima facie valid 
sentence is a statement by the trial judge detailing his reasons for selecting the particular sentence 
imposed.”  McCleary v. State, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971).
210 Gallion, 678 N.W.2d at 200.  The Gallion court explained a “truth-in-sentencing” environment, where it 
is necessary for sentencing courts to state on the record their reasons for the sentence, not just for the 
benefit of the defendant, but for the appellate record.  In Wisconsin, both the legislative mandate and the
judicial precedent require courts to justify sentences on the record.
211
 See United States v. Webb ___ F. 3d ___, 2005 WL 763367 n. 8 (6th Cir. April 6, 2005).
212
 Id.  
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The success of Wisconsin and other advisory state systems bodes well for the new 
federal approach to advisory guidelines.  For one thing, Wisconsin and other states have 
succeeded in utilizing guidelines to inform, not replace, judicial discretion.  The “end 
result . . . was a state system of advisory guidelines with comparative data and of 
appellate review of sentences for reasonableness that can serve as proof that such systems 
can effectively operate.”213
With the decision in Booker, many judges are expected to take the opportunity to 
exercise full discretion in sentencing in order to achieve a just punishment.  In his dissent, 
Justice Scalia reasoned that “logic compels the conclusion that the sentencing judge, after 
considering the recited factors (including the Guidelines) has full discretion, as full as 
what he possessed before the Act was passed, to sentence anywhere within the statutory 
range.”214 Viewed as legitimate advisory Guidelines, a court could sentence a defendant 
as if operating an indiscriminate sentencing scheme.”215  No sentencing scheme should 
exist without a serious reconsideration of ways in which to blend the positive aspects of 
individualized sentencing without the risks associated with its predecessor system.
The federal system can survive as an advisory system as have other states with 
advisory sentencing schemes.  At least ten states have an advisory sentencing system.216
The results under an advisory sentencing scheme can accomplish the goals of the SRA, if 
the states are good evidence of successful advisory schemes.  In fact, there are many 
213
 Hunt & Connelly, supra note 99, at F-21.
214
 125 S. Ct. at 47 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
215 The Sixth Circuit sentenced a defendant to a probationary period for bank fraud with the expectation 
that she serve her time in a halfway house as was the tradition for the last 15 years.  When the Department 
of Justice changed the policy, the defendant appealed and this allowed the court to reconsider not only the 
original sentence, but the impact of Blakely which was decided in the interim. As the Sixth Circuit stated,
. . . in order to comply with Blakely and the Sixth Amendment, the mandatory system of 
fixed rules calibrating sentences automatically to facts found by judges must be displaced 
by an indeterminate system in which the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in fact become 
“Guidelines” in the dictionary-definition sense (“an indication or outline of future 
policy,” [citation omitted]).  The “Guidelines” will become simply recommendations that 
the judge should seriously consider but may disregard when she believes that a different 
sentence is called for.
United States v. Montgomery, No. 03-5256 (6th Cir. 2004).
216
 Hunt & Connelly, supra note 99, at F-21.  
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aspects of a voluntary system that suggest it is more likely to can address the original 
goals of the SRA as effectively as can a mandatory system.217
Conclusion
Booker  has uprooted the sentencing procedures in federal court once again.  Not 
since the passage of the Sentencing guidelines in 1987 has there been so much upheaval 
in a sentencing scheme.  While some defense observers view Booker as the long awaited 
decision returning the system to the pre-Guidelines era, this view would be premature.  
Courts are going to continue to reference the Guidelines since, as a practical matter, most 
of the federal judiciary has only had experience with a mandatory Guidelines system.  
The key question will be what amount of deference should be afforded.  Courts that are 
resisting the change announced in Booker, by continuing to give great weight to the 
Guidelines are missing the point of Booker.  They are quite possibly sentencing in 
violation of the constitutional principles announced in the case and continuing the “ rote”
sentencing that was at issue in Booker.
The Sentencing Commission will continue to monitor appellate opinions and 
make recommendations on the workings of sentencing policies.  They collect and analyze 
data, prepare reports and offer training to the 94 federal judicial districts.  As they follow
their natural amendment cycle and maintain a working relationship with Congress, 
sentencing policies can actually achieve the original intent of the SRA.
Clearly, sentencing issues will evolve as the lower and appellate courts continue 
to interpret Booker.  A welcome dialogue resulting from this decision is the common law 
of sentencing contemplated by the SRA.  
An advisory guidelines system would promote some degree of sentencing 
uniformity because (1) judges would still be required to “take account of” and 
“consult” the guidelines in determining a sentence, and (2) sentences would still 
be subject to the harmonizing effect of appellate review, with the Sentencing 
Commission able, in turn, to make guideline amendment decisions based on 
appellate case law.”218
217
 Id.  The authors review advisory sentencing states and explain the perceived strengths of advisory 
sentencing systems.
218
 Booker Litigation Strategies Manual, A Reference for Criminal Defense Attorneys Distributed February 
17, 2005, Revised April 15, 2005, p. 4 (2005).
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As appellate courts interpret sentences under the reasonableness standard, lower 
courts will refine and mold sentencing policies, something expected when the SRA was 
first enacted.  In this article the author suggests two modest outcomes: that Booker
mandates that the judiciary consider factors outside of the guidelines range and that the 
reasonableness standard allows for full consideration and deference to the sentences 
imposed, something that has been lacking in sentencing for almost 20 years.  In this time 
of sentencing reconsideration, the courts and the legislature must take this opportunity to 
honestly examine the reforms of the last years and make adjustments that reflect the true 
balance of power.  If the advisory guidelines give true meaning to section 3553, then 
judges have fully restored discretion to consider both the guidelines and other valid,
relevant factors.
The current practices have failed to achieve the reasoned sentencing that was the 
initial goal of the SRA.  Now, at this juncture, all interested parties can urge Congress to 
take a wait-and-see approach to the post-Booker world.  As is evident from many of the 
cases thus far, the courts are not blindly avoiding the guidelines. Rather, they are giving 
reasoned consideration to the guidelines ranges and setting a sentence both within and 
without the ranges.  This is true discretion and, after all, the SRA had hoped to achieve 
this result initially in 1984.
http://law.bepress.com/pittlwps/art14
